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The nuclear weapons inspection regime implemented in Iraq
following the United Nations coalition victory in Desert Storm is
the most intrusive in history. Important conclusions about the
current non-proliferation regime can therefore be determined from
a study of Iraq's progress.
This thesis examines Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons. The supply side of the equation is also studied, with a
concentration upon the contributions of NATO nations. The
strategic culture of Iraq is discussed, in an effort to discover
why Iraq sought nuclear weapons. Finally, policy prescriptions are
advanced
.
The current non-proliferation regime needs to be improved if
the spread of nuclear weapons is to be halted, or even slowed. The
most promising way to improve this regime is to involve the U.N.
Special Commission and the U.N. Security Council in the management
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The most promising way to deal with the problem of nuclear
proliferation is with a unified worldwide effort. The U.N.
Security Council should be the primary instrument in the fight
to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The United Nations is
the only forum that contains all the parties involved, has the
ability to make international laws with all of the parties
present in the decision-making, and has the authority to
enforce these laws in a multilateral fashion. The nations of
Europe and the United States must be at the forefront of non-
proliferation activities, however.
The U.N. Special Commission discovered seventeen sites
related to nuclear weapons research in Iraq after Desert
Storm. Iraq's efforts placed it six months to three years
from possibly acquiring nuclear weapons. The inability of the
I.A.E.A. to monitor the Iraqi program revealed manor
shortcomings in the present non-proliferation regime. By
depending upon technologies the I.A.E.A. considered obsolete,
the Iraqis were able to make considerable progress without
significantly alarming the international community.
Given the strategic culture that has developed within
Iraq, it is improbable that its nuclear weapons program will
remain dormant following the withdrawal of the U.N. Special
Commission inspection teams. The historical antagonisms
between Iraq and nearby states such as Iran and Israel, and
other factors, such as an aspiration for leadership in the
Arab world, contribute to Iraq's desire to obtain nuclear
weapons
.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nuclear
weapons proliferation is becoming one of the leading threats
to world peace. The break-up of the U.S.S.R. has also
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magnified the problem of nuclear proliferation by giving other
nations access to Soviet nuclear technology.
The current non-proliferation regime is at a vital
crossroads in its history. Depending upon the results of the
inspections in Iraq, the I.A.E.A. could flourish or fail. If
the Iraqi nuclear weapons program revives after the
inspections are concluded, the Vienna-based organization will
be revealed as incapable of stemming the tide of nuclear
proliferation. If the Iraqi nuclear weapons program does not
resume operations, perhaps the world's confidence in the
I.A.E.A. can be restored. This is dependent, however, on how
large a role the I.A.E.A. plays in preventing the Iraqis from
reviving their nuclear weapons program. The U.N.S.C. should
play the predominant role in nuclear non-proliferation
activities, keeping the I.A.E.A. in an advisory role.
An alternative argument that may arise is that the
I.A.E.A. could be strengthened or expanded in an effort to
stem nuclear proliferation, rather than replaced. It appears,
however, that the combination of its lack of enforcement
powers and its inability to force nations to join the NPT
regime or retain the participation of nations that wish to
withdraw from the regime places the I.A.E.A. in an untenable
situation. The only way to strengthen the present regime is
to change the language of the treaty itself, and that may
cause an exodus of nations that wish to retain the option of
seeking nuclear weapons at some future time, as well as those
nations which may feel that stricter inspection standards
could interfere with their peaceful nuclear programs.
This leaves the I.A.E.A. in a "catch 22" situation: if
the language of the treaty is not strengthened, its current
weaknesses will remain; but, if the language is changed, the
number of nations that are signatories of the treaty may well
decline, hence weakening the ability of the I.A.E.A. to
contribute to a world free of nuclear proliferation. This
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inability to prevent nations from fleeing the organization
also hampers the I.A.E.A.'s ability to invoke the clause
allowing it to inspect undeclared facilities and to call on
the U.N.S.C. for assistance if these inspections are hampered.
If this clause is utilized, the nation under suspicion may
choose to withdraw from the regime rather than submit to the
demands
.
These factors demonstrate the primary limitation of the
current I.A.E.A. regime: any nation that does not want to be
a part of the legal regime does not have to remain within its
confines. The U.N.S.C. may be able to overcome this
limitation, because its enforcement capabilities could be used
to oblige nations to comply. The U.N.S.C. need not rely upon
the nation's desire to be reined in (with regard to its
nuclear weapons progress), and therefore the I.A.E.A. must
strengthen its link to that body. The spread of nuclear
weapons is a threat to world peace, and should be treated as
such by the United Nations.
vm
I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis argues that the current nuclear non-
proliferation regime, as defined by the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, must be
improved. The thesis also presents arguments about how this
should be done, if it is to have an effective role in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear
weapons states. A larger future role for the United Nations
is the suggested solution. This argument is supported by an
examination of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and the
methods that nation used to advance to within six months to
two years of having nuclear weapons capability.
Nuclear proliferation appears to be a primary threat that
the United States and its allies must deal with if peace,
stability and international security are to be maintained. It
seems plausible that as more nations obtain nuclear weapons,
the odds are increased that a nuclear strike will occur
somewhere in the world. The first step in avoiding a
destabilizing event such as a nuclear strike is to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons technology to governments in
unstable regions. Since the European Community and the United
States are two of the major exporters of nuclear and weapons
technology, they are inherently responsible for helping to
limit nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and the European
Community also have a direct stake in the problem of
proliferation, since they may someday be the target of a
nuclear strike from a nation that obtains these weapons.
The thesis begins with an examination of the efforts of
Iraq in order to discover how and why this country reached
such a high level of success with nuclear weapons research.
This includes factors both internal and external to Iraq
relevant to its nuclear weapons program. Following this, the
problem of supply is discussed, as the contributions to the
Iraqi nuclear weapons program by NATO nations are reviewed.
Next, the strategic culture of Iraq is studied, in order to
establish why Iraq sought nuclear weapons, and whether its
nuclear weapons programs will continue after the United
Nations regime currently in place comes to an end. Finally,
policy prescriptions necessary to prevent another case similar
to that of Iraq are discussed.
II. THE IRAQI PROBLEM
This chapter argues that the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and the Non-Prolif eration Treaty it draws its power
from, is not capable of controlling the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. A case study of the present situation in
Iraq regarding nuclear weapons is used to demonstrate this
point. The need for an increased role for the United Nations
is also discussed. Although there are other nations that have
come to the forefront in recent months in regard to the
I.A.E.A. and nuclear weapons proliferation, such as North
Korea, this chapter concentrates solely upon the Iraqi
situation
.
The importance of this topic stems from the fact that
there are a number of other nations that desire nuclear
weapons and must make a decision about whether to attempt to
obtain them. If these nations should learn the wrong lesson
from Iraq, that the only mistake Saddam made was starting a
war before his nuclear arsenal was complete, they may be
tempted to choose to pursue a nuclear weapons capability
clandestinely. The credibility of the current non-
proliferation regime was damaged by the Iraqi incident, and
this could have an adverse effect upon its ability to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons. If this credibility can be
restored, however, nations can be deterred from following the
clandestine path to nuclear weapons.
The case of Iraq aptly demonstrated the weaknesses of the
current non-proliferation regime. The International Atomic
Energy Agency and its primary tool, the Non-Prolif erat ion
Treaty, did not have sufficient safeguard provisions to
prevent Iraq from getting to within six months to a year of
having a nuclear weapons capability. 1 Now, the elimination
of Iraq as a potential nuclear power falls to the I.A.E.A., as
well as the United Nations. This chapter reviews the opinions
of experts regarding the effects that the Iraqi experience has
had on the non-proliferation regime, in order to define the
opposing sides of the argument. It then turns to the
institutions that will be involved, most importantly the
I.A.E.A. and the U.N., in order to define the tools that the
international community must use to eliminate a potential
future Iraqi nuclear threat. Next, this chapter ex.. Li 3 the
problems that need to be solved, both internal and external to
Iraq, so that the environment in which the non-proliferation
regime must operate in this case can be identified. Next, the
barriers that may stand in the way of the elimination of Iraq
as a potential nuclear power are discussed, to differentiate
the Iraqi case from other nations that may pose a nuclear
1 Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby : How the West
Armed Iraq
,
(New York: Houghlin Mifflin, 1991), p. 390. The
source quoted is an unnamed Pentagon analyst
.
proliferation threat. Finally, actions that have already been
taken to destroy Iraq's nuclear-weapons capability are




Nuclear non-proliferation experts have drawn different
conclusions from the Iraqi experience, ranging from the need
for a complete overhaul of the current non-proliferation
regime to a belief that Iraq is an anomaly and that the
I.A.E.A. is sufficient in its role as a primary non-
proliferation actor. The latter view is held by Joseph Pilat,
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, who judges that the
I.A.E.A. did its job well in Iraq, considering the limits of
its duties. Pilat notes that I.A.E.A. safeguards are designed
simply to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from
declared peaceful facilities to weapons purposes. J Since the
Iraqis used undeclared facilities to create their own nuclear
weapons material, the I.A.E.A. is not to blame for the
indiscretions committed in Iraq. He acknowledges that the
I.A.E.A. does not have a role in verification.
The relation between the NPT and IAEA safeguards, and the
fact that the IAEA has neither enforcement powers nor the
ability to apply sanctions (other than reporting
noncompliance to the Security Council and withholding
technical assistance), limit the regime's verification
- Joseph F. Pilat, "Iraq and the Future of Nuclear




, 6 March 1992, p. 1227.
role. Indeed the entire regime is designed not for
verification but rather, through its provisions for
inspections, for confidence building and for demonstrating
compliance... Iraq's behavior, then, clearly demonstrated
that the regime has had certain limitations built into it
that must be recognized and understood before sensible
policy decisions can be made
.
:
Other experts, such as David Kay of the Uranium Institute,
take the view that the I.A.E.A. has demonstrated that it
cannot contribute to the non-proliferation regime through its
inspection system. Kay contends that the United Nations,
through its Special Commission and the Security Council,
should assume control of the inspection and verification role.
His judgements are analyzed in greater depth in the next
section of this chapter.
B. INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN SOLVING THE IRAQI PROBLEM
1. I.A.E.A. :
The International Atomic Energy Agency was founded in
1957 with the dual purposes of containing the spread of
nuclear weapons and allowing all nations to reap the benefits
of peaceful nuclear technology. In 1970 the Non-Prolif erat ion
Treaty came into force, which increased the safeguard role of
the I.A.E.A." The safeguard system that was created by the
I.A.E.A. and the N.P.T. received a serious blow to its
Ibid. p. 1227
Zachary Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, International
Atomic Energy Agency: Strengthen Verification Authority , CRS
Issue Brief, 21 January 1992, p. 1.
credibility when the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program was revealed.
The Iraqis had at least ten nuclear weapons production
sites, and most of these escaped the I.A.E.A.'s attention.'
The primary reason most of these sites avoided the safeguards
was that the sites were not declared. A nuclear site must be
declared before the I.A.E.A. has the authority to inspect it.
It was simple for Iraq to avoid detection by not declaring
these sites, but that was not the only shortcoming that Iraq
demonstrated in the I.A.E.A.'s safeguard role. There was also
major nuclear weapons-related research and development taking
place at least at one site that inspectors visited frequently:
the Thuwaitha Nuclear Research Center.' There were some
15,000 employees working on nuclear weapons-related projects
at this center, and this was not detected by the I.A.E.A.
The primary weakness in the N.P.T. is aptly described
by David Kay, Secretary-General of the Uranium Institute, as
the "NPT bargain." The signatory nations, while agreeing to
inspections, did not want these inspections to interfere with
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The nuclear weapons states
(NWS) had to strike a bargain with the non-nuclear weapons
Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, Iraq and
Nuclear Weapons , CRS issue Brief, 2 March 1992, p. 10.
David Kay, Beyond Tunnels and Parking Lots:
Controlling Nuclear Proliferation After Iraq
,
(London: The





states (NNWS) in order to ensure that these peaceful uses
would not be hindered. The agreement was weakened by the
concessions that had to be given to ensure that major NNWS
would be signatories. This included the sharing of peaceful
nuclear technology, materials, and equipment. Therefore, if
a nation was able to bypass the safeguards without detection,
the I.A.E.A. would supply it, unknowingly, with the materials
it needed to produce nuclear weapons. In other words, the
N.P.T. not only did not create a strong enough system to
ensure that NNWSs could not acquire nuclear weapons
undetected, it also created a situation in which it assisted
NNWSs in reaching nuclear weapons goals. This combination was
exploited by Iraq at a high level, and the result was an
ambitious nuclear weapons program that escaped detection
despite the huge amount of resources that was diverted to it.
If the I.A.E.A. is to contribute significantly to the
correction of the Iraqi nuclear weapons problem, it is going
to have to correct these weaknesses. The N.P.T. procedures
contain a clause that allows the I.A.E.A. to inspect
undeclared facilities, but the I.A.E.A. has "virtually" never
had the political will to invoke it. 8 This clause allows the
I.A.E.A. to request the right to inspect "suspect sites" for
evidence of nuclear weapons progress, and if that request is
Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation ,
Adelphi Paper No. 263, (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Winter 1991), p. 31.
refused the U.N. Security Council can be called into the
matter. The I.A.E.A. must make use of this power in the case
of Iraq, and in any other nations where nuclear weapons
development is suspected. The linkage with the U.M.S.C. is
vital, because this gives the I.A.E.A. a way of enforcing its
provisions, since the agency has no method of enforcement on
its own.
The issue of "political will" is one that must be
discussed in more detail, since the argument may arise that if
this "will" can not be generated by the member states of the
I.A.E.A., then these states will not be able to muster it
within a new regime controlled by the U.N.S.C. In order to
assess the probability that this will be the case, it is
necessary to analyze the origins of this lack of political
will, which is inherent in the structure of the I.A.E.A. and
the N.P.T. If member nations were to take advantage of the
"suspect sites" clause, then any nation which was the target
of such action might choose to withdraw from the N.P.T.
regime. The terms of the treaty indicate that any nation may
withdraw with only "three months" notice (Article X) . If one
nation chose to take this path, other nations that might be
threatened by the exiting nation might choose to leave the
N.P.T. regime as well. If this were to occur on a large
scale, the regime, as it exists today, would be destroyed
through defection.
The I.A.E.A. became actively involved in the post-war
elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program with the
approval of U.N.S.C. Resolution 687, which gave this body the
authority to seize nuclear-weapons related materials in Iraq.
The U.N.S.C. had to approve two more resolutions in order to
force the Iraqis to comply with I.A.E.A. demands, because the
Vienna body was incapable of enforcing the resolution itself.'
On 12 July 1991, Hans Blix of the I.A.E.A. admitted that the
Iraqis had progressed beyond the capabilities that the
I.A.E.A. had believed they possessed. This discovery was
months behind the 29 November 1990 intelligence report given
to President Bush which stated that Iraq's nuclear weapons
program was within six months to a year of success.' Five
days later, on 17 July, Iraq became the first NPT signatory to




The following week, on 26 July 1991, the I.A.E.A.
declared that the Iraqis could not have possibly used the
nuclear facilities they possessed for peaceful purposes, as
Saddam Hussein had claimed. 1J The energy output of these
Pilat, p. 1225. The two resolutions referred to are
707 and 715.




Ann Devroy, "Iraq Weapons Deadline expires Without
Action," Washington Post
, 2 6 July 1991. p. A:l.
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facilities was less than that required to power them;
therefore they could not logically be used to produce energy.
The uranium enrichment level that the Iraqis had sought and
obtained was also far above that required for peaceful
purposes
.
Although the I.A.E.A. had established that the Iraqis
were developing nuclear weapons, the organization was still
having difficulty tracking down the sites where these weapons
were being developed. On July 31, Hans Blix informed the U.N.
that there were still large portions of the Iraqi uranium
enrichment program that had not been found through
inspections, despite the fact that three inspections had taken
place.* This led to the introduction of a proposed
resolution by the French to the U.N. that would allow the use
of force if the Iraqis did not cooperate fully with
inspections. This was eventually passed as resolution no. 707
on 15 August 1991. Once again the I.A.E.A. was incapable of
action without the support and assistance of the U.N.S.C.
At the I.A.E.A. 's 35th General Conference, in
September 1991, it was declared that the Iraqis were still
concealing nuclear weapons sites." This statement was made
after a fourth inspection had taken place, and again led to
the passage of a U.N.S.C. Resolution, this time no. 715,
R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Told of Iraqi Effort to Hide
Nuclear Project," Washington Post , 31 July, 1992, p. A:l.
14 Pilat, p. 1226.
11
designed to assist in the elimination of Iraq's nuclear
weapons program.
These examples of the I.A.E.A. needing U.N.S.C.
support and assistance even when international support is
solidly behind its efforts demonstrate the primary weakness of
the I.A.E.A.: its lack of an enforcement mechanism. This
tends to reinforce the argument supported by David Kay, who
was the team leader on many of the inspections inside Iraq,
that the U.N.S.C. should take over the role of the I.A.E.A.
2. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
The most important organization involved in the
elimination of Iraq as a potential NWS is the United Nations
Security Council. It took the forefront through the passage
of the three aforementioned resolutions, 687, 707, and 715.
According to David Kay, the United Nations Security Council is
the organization that should be tasked with the mission
currently done by the I.A.E.A.:
. .
.
[T]he Security Council now needs to take a forthright
and clear stand that any further acquisition or attempted
acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state will be
considered by it as a threat to international peace and
security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to which the
Council will respond with its own inspection and
elimination programs. I can say from first hand
experience that the knowledge that the Security Council
stood behind the Iraqi inspections changed both the
quality of the inspection and their ouccome from what
would have existed if they had only been carried out under
the mandate of the IAEA- the inspectors realized this and,
more importantly, so did the Iraqis. 1
15 Kay, p. 4.
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Another indicator of the power of the United Nations
Security Council in the Iraqi case is the confidence that the
I.A.E.A. inspectors have demonstrated when faced with Iraqi
threats of violence. This resolve is directly related to the
support that the U.N.S.C. has given these inspectors in this
particular case. Without the U.N.S.C, the I.A.E.A. would be
in the same position with Iraq that it was in before the Gulf
War: The agency would have no means of enforcement, no
"teeth." The U.N.S.C. possesses international power, such as
sanctions, peacekeeping forces, and the ability to focus world
opinion, that the I.A.E.A. clearly lacks.
C. PROBLEMS INTERNAL TO IRAQ
The first problem in Iraq that must be addressed is the
destruction of all nuclear weapons production capability.
There are ten known sites where nuclear weapons production
takes place. 1. These sites were not all destroyed during the
Gulf War by allied bombing attacks because intelligence did
not know where they were located. This task, therefore, has
fallen to the U.N. Security Council and the I.A.E.A. In order-
to facilitate this action, the U.N. has passed three
resolutions: 687, 707, 715.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 was the document that
officially ended the shooting war in the Gulf. It also
Timmerman, back cover
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required Iraq to stop all attempts at acquiring nuclear
weapons, and to turn all nuclear weapons material over to the
I.A.E.A.- This resolution was passed on 3 April 1991, and
Iraq did not choose to honor the agreement . When it became
obvious that the Iraqis were not going to reveal the location
of their nuclear weapons facilities, the U.N. Security Council
drafted a new document to ensure Iraqi compliance, Resolution
707
.
Resolution 707 reiterated the goals of Resolution 687, and
required the Iraqis to reveal the location of sites that had
been previously hidden from U.N. inspectors. It also gave the
inspection teams an "anytime, anywhere" capability in regards
to suspected nuclear weapons locations. 1 ' This is the most
intrusive regime any inspection team has ever been allowed in
the search for nuclear weapons. This resolution also called
for an end to all nuclear activities within Iraq, both weapons
and energy-related.' 1
The final Resolution, 715, contains long-term solutions
for the Iraqi nuclear problem in order to ensure that nuclear
weapons research does not continue unabated after the
• Pilat, p. 1225.
'
J Dunn, p. 32. The use of the "anywhere, anytime" clause
was first proposed by the United States in regard to the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It does not appear as if the
chemical weapons application will be featured in the final
draft of that treaty.
; Pilat, p. 1226
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U.N.S.C.- chartered teams leave Iraq. This resolution calls
for the Director General of the I.A.E.A., Hans Blix, to create
a system to monitor all Iraqi imports that may have nuclear
weapons applications. Blix is also required to update the




These resolutions limit the nuclear programs of Iraq to a
degree beyond that ever previously attempted with a sovereign
nation. They are designed to ensure that Iraq cannot achieve
the status of a nuclear-weapons state. These measures could
not have been implemented without the worldwide support that
the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait created. Because of these
special circumstances, it will probably be very difficult to
establish controls like the above resolutions on any other
nation seeking nuclear weapons, unless that nation also raises
the concern of the entire world via an aggressive action.
In order to determine the level of success that these
resolutions may reach, the path that Iraq took to obtain
nuclear weapons must be assessed. The single most conclusive
piece of evidence found to date linking Iraq to nuclear
weapons development is the progress report for the Al-Athir
plant
.
This document was found in Baghdad in September
Ibid
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1991." It described the intent and methods of Iraq's
nuclear weapons program.
The report... leaves no doubts about Iraq's intent. It
describes efforts on a broad front to design and test
components of a bomb similar to the device dropped on
Nagasaki in 1945, but with a core made from enriched
uranium rather than plutonium. . . Weapons experts. . . are
impressed by what the report reveals about the level and
range of effort the Iraqis were putting into the
program. —
This report describes a project that was designed to mimic
that used to create the bomb that was dropped by the United
States on Nagasaki.-- The Iraqis were able to conceal this
project for such a long period of time because the imports
needed to complete this project were not being monitored by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the I.A.E.A., since the
methodology used to create the Nagasaki bomb is considered
"obsolete" and inefficient. These organizations were
searching for more modern means of nuclear weapons production,
and the imports needed for the "outdated" method used by the
Iraqis were able to slip through the cracks. This reveals a
weakness in the current non-proliferation regime: an
inability to control dual-use exports, especially if the
materials involved are not associated with modern nuclear
Jerry Gray, "Baghdad Reveals it had Plutonium of
Weapons Grade," New York Times , 8 October 1991, p. Al . The
progress report covered the period from 1 January to 31 May
1990.
Colin Norman, "Iraq's Bomb Program: A Smoking Gun
Emerges," Science , 1 November 1991, p. 644.
Ibid.
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weapons production. "Dual -use" refers to material that can be
used for peaceful and nuclear weapons applications. The
Iraqis claimed that they needed the materials necessary for
their bomb program for peaceful end-purposes, including
prosthetics for war veterans and construction of a
petrochemical plant. -4
In order to produce the radioactive material needed to
power the bomb, the Iraqis also turned to an outdated method.
One of two types of material is needed for the core of the
type of nuclear weapon that the Iraqis were designing:
plutonium or highly enriched uranium (the Iraqis depended
primarily on highly enriched uranium) . Both of these
substances are monitored by the I.A.E.A., and neither one is
produced in nature.-" Therefore, Iraq needed to produce
these substances clandestinely, in facilities not subject to
I.A.E.A. safeguards. Iraq also needed to be able to import
the materials necessary to enrich the uranium without arising
suspicion. The Iraqi program depended upon calutron
technology to accomplish this task.-' This technology was
used by the United States during World War II, and is
extremely inefficient (it uses more energy than it creates)
.
Timmerman, p. 3 87.
Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear
,
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballmger, 1987), p. 336.
Elaine Sciolino, "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the
Holes in U.S. Intelligence," New York Times , 20 October 1991,
p. Al .
17
Because of this inefficiency, the I.A.E.A. did not actively
search for evidence of calutron production. Moreover, the
technology needed to produce calutrons is so common, that it
is practically impossible to monitor it, even if the I.A.E.A.
had attempted to do so.-
The outdated methods Iraq attempted to use to build a
nuclear weapon and to enrich uranium create a problem that the
U.N.S.C. resolutions cannot solve on their own. The material
used for both processes has become too common, and is
therefore very difficult to trace. The I.A.E.A. cannot
safeguard what it cannot find, and Iraq's nuclear program has
been difficult to immobilize while U.N. inspectors have had
the run of the nation. These difficulties will be magnified
when these inspectors leave Iraq, regardless of new
restrictions placed on that country by the U.N. The efforts
of the I.A.E.A. and the U.N.S.C. should be augmented by the
world's intelligence organizations as much as possible. Hans
Blix has suggested that the nations of the I.A.E.A. reveal any
intelligence they may have, on nations that are seeking
nuclear weapons, to that organization.- This will be
contingent, however, on the willingness of member nations to
reveal intelligence findings and sources to the one-hundred-
and-forty states that are signatories of the NPT.
a Pilat, p. 1227
Paul Lewis, "Atomic Energy Agency Maps Plans to go
After Nuclear Cheats," New York Times , 11 October 1991, p. A6
.
Another area that must be addressed to ensure the
elimination of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is the
presence of foreign nuclear technicians in that nation. The
presence of foreign technicians dates back to the 1950s and
1960s, when the USSR assisted in the construction of a light
water research reactor in the Thuwaitha desert.-"' The French
began sending technicians following their 1974 nuclear
cooperation agreement with Iraq. 3 ' The French agreed to send
technicians to Iraq at that time to monitor the activities at
the Osirak plant that the French assisted the Iraqis in
constructing. These technicians had departed before the June
1981 Israeli air strike on that installation, a strike which




D. PROBLEMS EXTERNAL TO IRAQ
In order to understand the uniqueness of the Iraqi
situation, as well as to demonstrate the impact that regional
considerations can have on the success of nuclear non-
proliferation programs such as the elimination of Iraq's
nuclear weapons program, it is necessary to discuss problems
Timmerman, p. 29.
Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today
,
(New
York: Vintage, 1984), p. 169.
31 Spector, Going Nuclear
, p. 160. This statement was
made in 1987 by Dr. Spector, one of the world's foremost
experts on nuclear proliferation.
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external to Iraq. This also demonstrates another weakness of
the present I.A.E.A. regime: it can not affect external
factors. Besides the transfer of nuclear weapons expertise to
Iraq from foreign nationals, there is one primary external
problem that is significant to the Iraqi situation: the
instability of the Middle Eastern region. Even excepting the
Desert Storm combatants, the Iraqis have been in a state of
war with three nations in that region in the last dozen years
(Israel, Kuwait, and Iran) . Although Iraqi aggression is a
primary cause behind all three conflicts, a stabilization of
the region could reduce Iraq's desire to possess nuclear
weapons
.
Israel might be able to contribute to this stability. The
Israelis have been a de facto nuclear power since the 1960s,
according to some sources. These same sources indicate that
the Israelis may have an arsenal of up to two hundred nuclear
weapons.' - As long as the Israelis are reportedly in
possession of such a nuclear arsenal, some countries in the
Arab world, including Iraq, are probably going to attempt to
acquire a similar capability. A recent publication from the
Nuclear Engineering International and the Uranium Institute
has suggested creating regional nuclear weapons-free zones,
: Spector, Going Nuclear
,
p. 130. According to Spector,
it is believed that each of these weapons has a yield equal to
that of the Nagasaki bomb, and that Israel is also in
possession of Jericho missiles capable of delivering nuclear
warheads up to 400 miles. That puts Iraq within range.
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enforced by the I.A.E.A. and the U.N. - It might be
difficult to convince the Israelis of the merits of such a
plan, however, given the constant threat that they face from
the Arab world and their relative size disadvantage.
Saddam Hussein has made the Iraqi position clear since
1974, declaring that his nation would be the first that would
acquire the bomb in the Arab world. In 1980, Hussein stated
that the purpose of the Arab bomb would be the destruction of
Israel . 54 These statements indicate the importance of Israel
in Iraqi nuclear weapons decisions
.
E. BARRIERS TO THE ELIMINATION OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROGRAM
A number of barriers must be overcome if the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program is to be permanently eliminated. The
potential success of future U.N.S.C. actions as compared to
possible I.A.E.A. efforts demonstrates an advantage in giving
the U.N.S.C. more authority in the realm of nuclear
proliferation prevention. The first of these barriers is the
government of Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein. Hussein has given
in grudgingly to all U.N.S.C. resolutions, and has at times
had inspectors held at gunpoint in an effort to prevent them
;;John Simpson, Nuclear Non-Prolif erat ion : Where do we
go after Iraq
,
(London: The Uranium Institute, September
1991)
, p. 4.




from uncovering evidence of his nuclear weapons program.
Saddam has three major stakes in preventing the destruction of
this weapons program: His desired standing in the Arab world,
maintaining face in his own nation, and a professed desire to
eliminate the state of Israel from the face of the earth. 3 '
The actions of the Iraqi government have led the United States
to threaten military responses twice since the conclusion of
the Gulf War, and Saddam has backed down just prior to
conflict on both of these occasions. The I.A.E.A. does not
possess the capability to affect a nation's leader, such as
Saddam, but the U.N.S.C. may have the ability to encourage the
ouster of Saddam Hussein through the use of sanctions.
A second barrier confronting the forces attempting to
remove Iraq's nuclear weapons capability is a lack of
intelligence. The U.N.S.C. and the I.A.E.A. cannot destroy
what they cannot find, and the Iraqis may not have revealed
all their nuclear weapons facilities as of yet. The Middle
East has always been difficult for Western intelligence assets
to penetrate, and the size and extent that the Iraqi
clandestine nuclear weapons program reached without being
detected exemplifies this shortcoming.' Perhaps Israel's
Mossad could be of assistance in this area, given its
reputation of success in Middle East intelligence activity.
Timmerman, pp. 13-14.
' Kay, p. 1.
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The U.N. may be able to create a multinational intelligence
agency charged solely with the detection of nuclear weapons
progress by NNWSs . Hans Blix of the I.A.E.A. has suggested an
intelligence-sharing system for the I.A.E.A., but it would be
limited by the willingness of its member nations to share
intelligence with the other nations in the organization, both
friends and foes.
A third barrier to the effectiveness of the international
action to eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons program is the
infrastructure that is present in Iraq. Although the physical
assets are being destroyed by the inspection teams, the human
assets will remain. The Iraqi program did not depend upon
foreign technicians to the degree first suspected; it relied
upon foreign-trained Iraqi technicians. The head of the
nuclear weapons program appears to be Dr. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar,
who was educated in the United Kingdom. These human assets
will be able to attempt to rebuild the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program after the U.N. leaves Iraq.
The final barrier th^t stands in the way of the removal of
the nuclear weapons programs of potential new nuclear powers
is the end of the Cold War. The nuclear umbrellas that were
once extended by the United States and the Soviet Union may
well be withdrawn. This could force the smaller nations of
Ben Sanders, "Developments of Concern for Horizontal
Proliferation, " Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-
Proliferation
, Number 16, Winter 1991/92, p. 11.
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the world, such as Iraq, to become more responsible for their
own security, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons is one
method, they tend to believe, that can be used to help enhance
their national security. The U.N. may be able to reassure
small nations of their security through the use of
peacekeeping forces
.
F. THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
According to testimony by Robert Gates, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, on 22 January 1992, once the U.N.
delegation leaves Iraq, the Iraqis will be able to renew their
quest for nuclear weapons
.
"In our opinion Iraq will remain a primary proliferation
threat at least as long as Saddam Hussein remains in
power, " Mr. Gates said. He added that "the cadre of
scientists and engineers trained for these programs will
be able to reconstitute any dormant program rapidly, "...
As for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, Mr. Gates said much
of the infrastructure for the production of weapons-grade
materials must be rebuilt before Iraq can produce nuclear
weapons. But he added, "We measure the time required in
a few, rather than many, years." 38
These statements paint a grim picture about the success of the
current U.N.S.C. action ibeing taken in Iraq. How can the most
intrusive nuclear weapons inspection regime in history be such
a failure in the long run?
First of all, the current measures being taken in Iraq are
temporary. Inspectors most likely will not be placed in Iraq
Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqis Could Pose a Threat Soon,
C.I. A. Chief Says," New York Times , 16 January 1992, p. A9 .
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indefinitely. This is despite the fact that the United
States, along with Hans Blix, has made a request for "open-
ended, " or permanent, inspections within Iraq.' An
important factor preventing such open-ended inspections is
Iraq's status as a sovereign nation, and despite the fact that
it has shown blatant aggression it must be treated as such.
Although the United Nations and I.A.E.A. will watch Iraq
carefully for signs of a renewed nuclear weapons program, it
must be remembered that the Iraqis successfully maintained a
clandestine program for ten years prior to the Gulf War
without alarming the West . In order to prevent the Iraqis
from resuming nuclear weapons research a new regime must be
put into place, or the old one upgraded.
A second reason for the expected failure of the U.N.S.C.
and I.A.E.A. actions resides in the weaknesses of the
I.A.E.A., already outlined in this chapter. If these
shortcomings are not at least partially resolved, this body
should be replaced or supplemented by a new regime. Moreover,
the events in Iraq could have one of two effects on the
ability of the I.A.E.A to prevent nuclear proliferation: one
negative, and one positive. The negative effect is the lesson
that other proliferating nations could learn from Iraq: that
Smith, p. A:28
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the only mistake Hussein made was starting a war six months
before he had the bomb. 4.
This could lead to an evaporation of the I.A.E.A.'s
credibility as an institution able to prevent nuclear
proliferation, since Iraq was under full-scope safeguards. A
weakening of the I.A.E.A. could directly lead to a more daring
Iraqi nuclear weapons program after the U.N. resolutions have
run their course. This weakening could also lead to an
epidemic of nuclear proliferation among nations that had been
deterred from pursuing these weapons by I.A.E.A. safeguards,
an epidemic that could occur for two reasons. First of all,
cheating nations would perceive that the I.A.E.A. is incapable
of detecting any clandestine programs they may develop.
Secondly, nations would be threatened by the belief that other
nations were cheating, and therefore follow suit for fear of
being overwhelmed by potential nuclear enemies. Both of these
factors demonstrate the necessity for an effective non-
proliferation regime to be sustained, either through the
I.A.E.A. or in place of it.
The positive effect that could develop, and has to some
degree developed, from the Iraqi incident is the galvanizing
of world opinion about the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
This could create the political atmosphere necessary for the
addition of more stringent safeguard measures to the N.P.T.,
;
' Kay, p. 1.
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as well as for the widening of the U.N.'s authority in this
area. Due to the desires of NNWSs to avoid "defeated powers"
status, this authority may not expand enough to prevent
nuclear proliferation from increasing, however.
The Iraqi experience could also help to promote certain
technologies, techniques , and procedures, for example,
aerial inspection, thereby establishing a strong rationale
for their place in the new arms control panoply. Yet, as
suggested, neither the highly intrusive inspections or the
continuous monitoring regime as applied to Iraq is likely
to have a place per se in future bilateral, regional, or
international accords without significant qualifications
and conditions. Parties are not likely to accept
instruments that treat them as 'defeated powers, ' with all
that such treatment allows in terms of access. The United
States could not accept such an approach either
constitutionally or as a matter of U.S. national security
policy. It may be possible to strengthen future arms
accords substantially, but there will always be
limitations as long as the accords are based on mutual
agreement among sovereign states. 41
This brings up a third reason why it is believed that the
Iraqi nuclear weapons program will continue after the
inspection teams leave Iraq: Lack of a U.N.S.C. role in day-
to-day nuclear proliferation problems. The U.N.S.C. has the
authority and the ability to enforce non-proliferation laws,
but in the present regime the actions of the U.N.S.C. in Iraq
are the exception rather than the rule.
41 Pilat, p. 1228.
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III. THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLY: A EUROPEAN STANDPOINT
The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War by the United Nations
coalition in February 1991 has brought to light a problem that
has immense consequences within the NATO community: The
contributions of NATO nations to the nuclear weapons program
of Iraq. Published reports suggest that at least four nations
share some of the responsibility for Iraq's progress in
nuclear proliferation: France, Germany, the United States,
and Italy.
The problems that an Iraqi nuclear arsenal could create
for NATO, as well as the rest of the world, are many-fold.
First, Iraq is in a highly unstable region, as evidenced by
the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War (which both, incidently, were
initiated by Saddam Hussein) , and the continuous religious
turmoil that dominates it. This increases the chances that
the "... uncertainties of military decision making in the
emerging nuclear states [such as Iraq] . . . may some day lead to
nuclear confrontation." 4 "' The internal instability, as well
as the current leadership, lead to a second cause of concern.
"The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the danger that
nuclear arms may fall into the hands of radical, anti-status
Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear
, p. 4
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quo forces as the result of war, revolution or coup
d'etat."' The Iraqi situation is one with the radical
leader already in place due to a coup, and he is attempting to
obtain v/eapons of mass destruction in order to upset the
status quo in his favor. A third and final problem that NATO
must confront is that "The spread of nuclear weapons is also
increasing the likelihood of conventional war, as governments
have been tempted to strike preemptively against the nuclear
installations of potential adversaries." 44 This combination
of factors leads to the conclusion that nuclear weapons in the
hands of Iraq would represent an extremely unfavorable
situation if international stability is a desired goal.
A . BACKGROUND
This problem was brought to the forefront of international
news following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War.
At the end of the Gulf War Security Council Resolution 687
demanded that Iraq should help the UN remove or destroy
all its nuclear-weapons equipment... Iraq accepted this
resolution unconditionally. 4 "
This allowed for a series of UN inspections, the first
being in May 1991 at the two nuclear research reactors at
Tuwaitha. These had previously been inspected by the
4 - Ibid.
44 Ibid, p. 5.
45
"Iraq's Nuclear Enigma," The Economist
, 13 July 1991,
p. 43 .
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International Atomic Energy Agency through provisions of the
Non-Prolif eration Treaty. "At the same time, however, the
team visited a nearby site and a site at Tarmit . . . they found
evidence of a huge and hitherto unobserved uranium-enrichment
programme." 4 A second inspection occurred at Al Gharaid on
22 June 1991. This time inspectors were held up by Iraqis for
a period of time. During this period of time they saw
equipment being removed. When they gained entry, the
equipment was gone. At a third inspection, "In an incident on
June 28 [1991], Iraqi soldiers fired over the heads of U.N.
inspectors filming the hasty withdrawal of equipment from a
military transportation base near Baghdad.""
On 8 July 1991, Iraq "... disclosed to the United Nations
details of an extensive, largely secret nuclear development
program that the United States charged today is capable of
producing atomic weapons."" 1 This program was as attempt to
enrich uranium, a prerequisite in the development of nuclear
arms. On the fourteenth of the same month, "Iraq gave the
United Nations a new list of clandestine nuclear
installations..." 4 '' Then, on 5 August 1991 Iraq revealed
4
" Ibid.
Ann Devroy, "Iraq Gives Information to UN on Extensive
Nuclear Program," N.Y. Times , 9 July 1991, p. Al .
48 Ibid.
Paul Lewis, "Baghdad Hands U.N. a New List of
Clandestine Atomic Installations," N.Y. Times , 15 July 1991,
p . A5 .
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"... that its scientists were secretly able to extract a small
amount of plutonium, suitable for making an atomic bomb, from
spent fuel at a nuclear installation whose operations came
under international safeguards..."' On 24 September 1991,
in an attempt to discover the identity of the individual who
masterminded the program, a U.N. team raided the Record Center
of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. Two weeks later, on 7
October 1991, U.N. inspectors "... discovered a complex of
buildings that apparently served as the nerve center of
President Saddam Hussein's covert nuclear weapons program but
largely escaped allied attack during the Persian Gulf war."
These investigations "... uncovered a nuclear program far
grander in scope, more sophisticated in design and much
further along than was suspected in Washington."" It now
appears that the Iraqis were much further along than was
suspected prior to the U. N. inspections.
Iraqi informants have told U.S. intelligence of a
clandestine electromagnetic process Baghdad was using to
separate weapons-grade material. The process has already
produced about 90 pounds of uranium, some of it highly
enriched. That's enough to make a bomb../'
Jerry Gray, "Baghdad Reveals it had Plutonium of
Weapons Grade," New York Times
,
5 August 1991, p. Al
.
Paul Lewis, "U.N. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center
Concealed by Iraq," p. Al
.
Elaine Sciolino, "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the
Holes in U.S. Intelligence," p. E5
.
"Iraq's Nuclear Menace," New York Times , 11 July 1991,
p. A14.
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This finding runs counter to what the international
community believed up until this revelation.
Before the war, Iraq was judged to be 5 to 10 years away
from a full-fledged nuclear arsenal and bomb-making
capability. The more imminent threat came from 100 pounds
of known weapons-grade material that was checked
periodically by international inspectors; by worst-case
assessment, it could have been turned into a bomb in a
year or less . '
In addition to the uranium, Iraq has admitted to extracting
three grams of plutonium from spent fuel. This is significant
because the amount of plutonium needed to make an atomic bomb
is much lower than the amount of uranium it would take to make
a bomb of the same destructive capability. "Mr. Leventhal
said about eight kilograms of plutonium- which can be
chemically separated from spent fuel from a research or
production reactor- are needed to make an imploding nuclear
device, compared with about 2 5 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium." " On top of all this, the Iraqis are apparently
also pursuing hydrogen bomb technology. Although Iraq was
still apparently several years from the hydrogen bomb, this
creates an even more dangerous situation because this type of
bomb can be much more destructive than the atomic bomb.
The basic defense that the Iraqis have used in the
international arena concerning their nuclear programs, is that
all this research has been for peaceful energy purposes. "...
Ibid.
Jerry Gray, "Baghdad Reveals it had Plutonium of
Weapons Grade," p. Al
.
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Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein did not admit to a
weapons program but instead contended that Iraq's nuclear
program is devoted for peaceful purposes. "'" There are three
factors to examine to decide the validity of this defense:
the materials needed; the processes required; and the capital
equipment that each must have.
On the material side, there are two paths to nuclear
weapons: uranium and plutonium. There are two types of
uranium, U-235 (light) and U-238 (heavy) . Although the
natural state of uranium is 0.7% light and 99.3% heavy, in
order to use uranium for weapons purposes it must be enriched
to 90% light or more. Much of the uranium found in Iraq has
been enriched to this level. This brings a question into
focus: why have the Iraqis enriched their uranium in this
way? "Because highly enriched uranium is sometimes used to
fuel research reactors, a nation can have legitimate reasons
for obtaining small quantities of this material, despite its
usefulness in nuclear explosives."'" The uranium enrichment
necessary for use in power reactors is only 3%, however.
Another factor to consider is that "... developing a sizable
independent uranium enrichment capability is economically
justifiable only for nations with large domestic nuclear power
John M. Goshko, "Iraq Gives Information to U.N. on
Extensive Nuclear Program, " N.Y. Times , 9 July 1991, p. Al .




programs or significant potential export markets. " c,s
Therefore, the material involved refutes the argument that
Iraq's nuclear research is for peaceful purposes only.
The capital equipment and processes used in the nuclear
program also counters the Iraqi claim of peaceful motives.
The Iraqis employ the calutron method to enrich their uranium;
they had thirty of these, plus ninety more ready to be on line
in six to eighteen months.
The main attraction [of the Iraqi enrichment program] used
technology all but forgotten among nuclear sophisticates,
but adequate for the task if its inelegance, inefficiency
and costliness can be borne. In a calutron, beams of
charged uranium atoms pass through a magnetic field. The
magnetic field bends the trajectory of the lighter atoms
of U-235 more than it does that of the heavier U-238...
Calutron enrichment costs far too much to make sense in a
civil nuclear programme.
'
To be more precise, "... To make a single gram of enriched
uranium by the electromagnetic approach would require five
times the energy likely to be retrieved from that gram...""
Logic dictates that the only use for this enrichment,
therefore, is in weapons production.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or
NPT, is the tool by which the International Atomic Energy
Agency has attempted to prevent nations like Iraq from
Ibid.
"By-Ways That Lead to the Bomb,
"
The Economist , 2 July
1991, p. 101.
Frank Prial, "U.N. Inspectors Report Iraq Still
Conceals Atom Program," New York Times
,
16 July 1991, p. A6
.
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acquiring nuclear weapons. It prohibits non-nuclear weapons
states from acquiring or creating nuclear explosives, places
safeguards on their nuclear actions, and prevents nations that
deploy nuclear weapons from transferring that ability to
nations without that capability. The treaty also states that
nations that have already obtained peaceful nuclear technology
should share it with nations that lack that technology. This
is in order to appease non-nuclear nations and entice them to
sign the document. The treaty authorizes inspections of the
facilities of signatory nations that are importing nuclear
material or have constructed nuclear plants. It also places
safeguards on the importation and exportation of nuclear
material and technology, as this reproduction of Section 2 of
Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty attests.
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:
(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b)
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable
material shall be subject to the safeguards required by
this Article. '
The NPT has a series of weaknesses, however. The first of
these is that there are limits to the facilities that are-
subject to inspection by the IAEA. In order for said
facilities to be subject to inspection, they must be declared
by the host nation. Secondly, a country is permitted to
bl J. Simpson, The 1990 NPT Review Conference: context and
issues
,
(London: The Uranium Institute, 1991), p. 75.
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obtain all the necessary material and equipment for the
construction of an atomic weapon under the terms of the
treaty, as long as these components are not assembled into the
completed weapon. Article II of the NPT specifies the
prohibitions on non-nuclear weapon states, and only the
acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons themselves, not
the components, is mentioned.
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor-
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices . ' 2
This enables nations to get dangerously close to weapons
production and still remain within the legal confines of the
treaty. A third weakness is that a nation can opt out of the
treaty with the 'supreme interests' clause, Article X.
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of
its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to
all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice
shall include a statement of the exraordinary events it
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Iraq seemed to be taking advantage of the above weaknesses
in its bid for nuclear weapons: acquire the materials
'- Ibid.
1,3 Ibid.
, p. 7 9
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necessary, not declaring those which were illegal under the
auspices of the treaty, then invoking the 'supreme interests'
clause and assembling the weapons. What consequences would
the Iraqis have to face under the treaty for such an action,
or for an even more blatant violation? This question brings
up a fourth weakness present in the treaty: a lack of teeth.
There are no provisions for punishment under the NPT for any
violation
.
Present means of intelligence and reconnaissance were
proven by the Iraqi case to be insufficient to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons. A number of shortcomings must be
addressed in order to understand how Iraq achieved the level
that it did without generation concern. First of all, since
the technique used was not expected by the monitoring powers,
many of the imports that Iraq obtained did not arouse
suspicion. The aforementioned calutron method is "...
relatively easy to build. They use few exotic materials, in
principle allowing them to be largely constructed without
Western aid." i This shows a weakness in intelligence, since
it was not discovered that this method was being used, and
translates into a weakness in reconnaissance because all such
activity was focused on searching for signs of more modern
methods. A second shortcoming that became apparent was a lack
of assets devoted to the problem.
William J. Broad, "Iraqi Atom Effort Exposes Weakness




[T]he C.I. A. had only one technical analyst responsible
for examining Iraq's nuclear program before the August
1990 invasion of Kuwait, and he had to monitor Japan as
well. The Defense Intelligence Agency had only two
analysts assigned to Iraq, but 42 to issues relating to
Americans missing in action in Southeast Asia...
satellites that had been devoted to the Iran-Iraq border
in the mid-1980 's to help Iraq in its war against Iran
were shifted back to the Soviet Union once the war was
over .
This lack of insight into Iraqi methods and failure to use
available assets led to an inability for intelligence and
reconnaissance to succeed in the detection of Iraqi nuclear
achievements
.
Iraqi nuclear achievements were helped a great deal by
NATO nations in two specific time periods: Prior to the 1981




Prior to the raid on Osirak, France was the primary
contributor. These contributions began in 1974, when the two
nations signed a nuclear cooperation agreement.
Under the agreement, France was to supply Baghdad with a
large reactor and help build the Tuwaitha center into a
'nuclear university' capable of training some six hundred
scientists and technicians. In return, Iraq reportedly
promised to buy French arms and to assure France a long-
term supply of oil.
Elaine Sciolino, "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the
Holes in U.S. Intelligence," p. E5
.
Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today , p.
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This final sentence brings to light one of the two reasons why
France gave so much nuclear aid to Iraq during this time
period: France is dependent on imported oil. The other
reason is that France was one of only two nations with nuclear
weapons that had not signed the NPT, the other being China.
(Israel, India, and South Africa may also fall into this
category, but they do not publicly admit that they have
nuclear weapons, although it is believed by some observers
that they do; India has exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device,
and it is believed that South Africa has exploded a nuclear
weapon.)' In August 1976 France and Iraq signed a sales
contract for a forty-megawatt and an eight-hundred-kilowatt
testing reactor, Isis and Osirak, to be constructed by France
in Iraq. The international reaction was not long in coming:
. .
.
[W] ithin months after the signing of the August 1976
sales contract for the plants, Israel, the United States,
and several European governments protested to France.
They were alarmed that the reactors were to be fueled with
highly enriched uranium that could be directly used for
nuclear weapons. France had offered to provide Iraq with
seventy-two kilograms initially, enough to fuel the
reactor for a year- or to produce several nuclear bombs
.
If Iraq elected to disregard the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards covering the material and had
prepared the necessary non-nuclear components of nuclear
weapons in advance, the highly enriched material could
give it a small nuclear arsenal in a matter of weeks."'-
Osirak gave the Iraqis the capability to produce ten
kilograms of plutonium a year. In 1978, the French gave into
Within the last year, China, France and South Africa
have all become signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.




international pressure and attempted to convince the Iraqis to
accept an alternative fuel known as caramel, which was only
enriched to a level of 7% and was hence unusable for nuclear-
weapons . The Iraqis claimed that this fuel was unproven as a
suitable substitute, despite the fact that it had been tested
as such, and demanded weapons-grade fuel. This has since been
taken as proof that the Iraqis were seeking nuclear weapons at
this time.
France ultimately gave in to Iraqi demands, announcing its
decision in March 1980. In the negotiations, however,
Iraq accepted three important additional safeguards to
prevent any misuse of Osirak and its fuel. First, France
would not supply all seventy-two kilograms of fresh highly
enriched uranium at once, but would transfer it in stages,
as it was needed, so that no more than twenty-four
kilograms (enough to load Osirak and reload it once) would
be in Iraq at any time. Spent fuel would be returned
promptly to France. Although twenty-four kilograms would
easily be enough for one nuclear device, half of the
material would normally be in use in Osirak and highly
radioactive, making it unsuitable for weapons without
extensive processing.
The second safeguard involved the pre-irradiacion of all
highly enriched fuel, which would make it difficult to
transfer without shielding and other precautions. The final
safeguard was the placement of French technicians at Osirak
through 1989, to ensure that clandestine activities did not
take place. These safeguards did not appease the
international fear about supplying Iraq with enriched uranium,
but they did reduce the risk presented.
Ibid. p. 169.
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German contributions in this time period were associated
with the firm NUKEM
:
. . .
Iraq attempted to obtain fabricated depleted uranium
fuel pins directly from NUKEM. Iraq reportedly claimed
the pins were being purchased for use in a yet-to-be-built
training reactor. A more likely reason in the eyes of
some experts, particularly since Iraq is not known to have
had such a training reactor on order, was that the pins
were intended to be inserted into Osirak and that Iraq was
seeking to avoid the necessity of fabricating the pins
itself. NUKEM tried to subcontract portions of the job to
Canadian and American firms reportedly without disclosing
the ultimate destination of the finished product. When
U.S. and Canadian regulatory officials looked into the
matter, they discovered this and the contract went no
further
.
This appeared to be a covert operation, of which the German
government had no knowledge.
The United States played the watchdog during this period.
By protesting the French transfer of nuclear material to Iraq,
the U.S. managed to reduce the threat presented by insisting
on the aforementioned safeguards. The U.S. was also
instrumental in blocking the export of the fabricated depleted
uranium pins by NUKEM to Iraq. Furthermore, the United States
attempted to dissuade the Italians from selling nuclear
equipment to the Iraqis. Hence, the U.S. prevented the Iraqi
nuclear menace from being a threat at an even earlier date, at
least in the 1970s and early 80s.





Parallelling its dealings with France in 1976, Iraq purchased
from Italy five laboratories for the Tuwaitha center,
including three hot cells, lead shielded rooms with remote-
handling equipment for examining and processing radioactive
materials. U.S. officials believed that if Iraq produced
plutonium by irradiating unenriched uranium targets in Osirak,
the hot cells could separate enough plutonium for
approximately one nuclear device per year. '
The laboratories also gave the Iraqis the ability to
manufacture plutonium. Italian motives were much the same as
the French ones; they had a high dependence on imported oil,
and Iraq guaranteed this in return for Italy's nuclear trade.
The Italians also, in 1980-81, educated Iraqi technicians in
Italian schools and began to negotiate for the construction of
a reprocessing plant. Furthermore, in 1980, the Iraqis
purchased six tons of depleted uranium and four tons of
yellowcake from Italy.
There were many efforts made by illegal means to slow down
the nuclearization of the Iraqi military prior to the raid on
Osirak. "In April 1979, the core structures for Osirak and
the smaller Isis reactor were destroyed by a bomb planted in
a warehouse in Seine-sur-Mer , France, where the equipment was
awaiting shipment to Iraq." Although this has never been
proven, it is suspected that the Israelis were responsible.
The French eventually rebuilt the cores and sent them at a





murder of Dr. Yahya el-Mashad, an Egyptian nuclear scientist
working for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission."^ Once
again it is believed that Israel was involved, although this
has never been proven.
Two months later, a series of bombings occurred at the
residences or offices of several officials of Iraq's key
nuclear suppliers: SNIA-Techint , the Italian company
supplying the hot cells to Iraq; its partner in the sale,
Ansaldo Mercanico Nucleare; and Techniatome, the French
government -owned subsidiary supplying the Osirak reactor.
In addition, officials and workers in these and several
other French and Italian companies received threatening
letters from the Committee to Safeguard the Islamic
Revolution, warning them to stop their work on Iraq's
nuclear program.
On 7 June 1981, the Israelis launched an attack upon the
reactor at Osirak. Two F-16s destroyed the reactor in a
bombing raid. At the time, and for many years to come, it was
believed that this attack had a decisively debilitating effect
upon the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. "Iraq's nuclear
program has been dormant since Israel's 1981 bombing raid
destroyed its centerpiece, the large French-supplied Osiraq
research reactor outside Baghdad."" 1 This statement was made
by Leonard Spector, one, of the foremost experts on nuclear
proliferation in the world, in 1987, just three years prior to
the Gulf war. Obviously the raid did not have the effect that











eyes to bear upon the Iraqi nuclear program. This had two
effects, the first of which was a slowdown in the transfer of
nuclear weapons equipment, material, and technology to Iraq,
although this was a short-term change in many cases. The
second effect, unfortunately, was that the Iraqis learned that
the only way for their program to succeed was to shroud it in
deep secrecy.
C. OSIRAK TO DESERT STORM
The French acted quickly after the raid to disassociate
themselves from the Iraqi nuclear program, announcing a
termination of their nuclear assistance to Iraq immediately
after the raid on Osirak. Within months, however, the
French had shifted their position and made an agreement with
Iraq to rebuild Osirak. The French had decided to include
more powerful safeguards, however.
France revealed the specific terms of its plan early in
1982. Iraq would have to accept low-enriched caramel fuel
for the plant; French technicians would remain at the site
permanently; and in addition, Iraq would have to include
other states in the operation of the installation, making
it a regional research center. :
The Iraqis did not give an immediate answer to this proposal,
but no work was ever done to reconstruct the plant. This
apparently ended French involvement in the Iraqi nuclear-
weapons program.




, p. 183 .
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The Germans had no significant policy reaction to the
raid, since the German government had no formal ties to the
Iraqi nuclear program. In the latter portion of the 1980s,
however, there were a series of transactions involving German
f 1 rms
:
Secret investigation documents of the FRG Economics
Ministry show that several companies were involved in
Iraqi nuclear projects. Investigations are currently
being conducted into the companies H. and H. Metalform,
Inwako GmbH, Interatom, Export-Union Duesseldorf, and
Sitico GmbH, among others... H. and H. Metalform assisted
Iraq in their quest for centrifuge technology. Inwako was
involved with the shipping of ring magnets that were
necessary for calutron operation. Interatom GmbH
transferred technological know-how in the field of nuclear
technology to the Iraqis. Finally, Sitico GmbH shipped
enriched uranium to the Iraqis without the proper
permits . 7!
The U.S. reaction to the raid was to initiate an
investigation into Israeli allegations that the Iraqis were
covertly producing nuclear weapons, and the vehicle for this
investigation was the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
This body came to the conclusion that, although the capability
to build nuclear weapons was present, it was highly improbable
that the Iraqis had reached an advanced point in their
development, given the presence of French technicians at the
nuclear research facilities. 01 These technicians were placed
at these positions to make it more difficult for Iraq to
divert nuclear material meant for peaceful means to weapons




19 91, pp. 1.0-11.
Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today
, p. 390.
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use, and a U.S. Senate Committee concluded that the
technicians were successful in their mission. Given the
subsequent developments in mid-1991 that revealed the Iraqi
ability to overcome such safeguards, it is possible that this
judgement was overly optimistic.
U.S. involvement went beyond merely passing judgement on
others during the decade of the 1980s, however. During 1989,
the New Jersey firm Consarc was in the midst of arranging a
deal with Iraq to sell it high-temperature furnaces, which
were designed solely for use in melting zirconium, a material
needed for the coating of uranium rods, a procedure necessary
in the development of nuclear weapons. The firm informed the
Commerce Department that these furnaces could be used for
nuclear weapons development, but Commerce approved the sale.
Eventually the Pentagon interceded, and the sale was
blocked. 7 Also during the latter part of the 1980s, the
U.S. exported a half a million dollars worth of computers to
Iraq, which could have been diverted to nuclear weapons
development
.
The Italians followed the French example, and advised the
United States that they did not intend to offer additional
Gary Milhollm, Licensing Mass Destruction: U.S.
Exports to Iraq: 1985-1990
,
(Washington: Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, 1991), p. 11.
3
~ Ibid., p. 5.
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nuclear equipment to Iraq.'" Unfortunately, the similarity
did not end there, and the Italians were later implicated in
nuclear-related dealings with Iraq, similar to the French
turnaround of 1981.
According to evidence obtained in a 1984 Italian
prosecution, senior Iraqi military figures expressed
interest in obtaining 33.9 kilograms (74.6 pounds) of
plutonium- enough for several weapons- from an Italian
arms smuggler ring purporting to have the material for
sale. . . The deal fell through when, after a third meeting
in Baghdad, the smugglers were unable to produce samples
of the nuclear material.""''
This was different from the French case in that the Italian
government apparently did not sanction the move, but it was
similar because neither action got past the bargaining phase.
D. THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1978 as a
reaction to the 1974 Indian nuclear test . The Indians had
exploited assistance from the United States and Canada into
the ability to create what they deemed a peaceful nuclear
explosion, and this concerned the international community
sufficiently to establish an export control regime. This
body, along with individual governmental internal regulation,
is the most vital tool in the effort to stop a repeat of the
Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today
, p. 183.
34 Spector, Going Nuclear
, p. 163.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "New Approaches to Nuclear
Proliferation Policy," Scienc e, 29 May 1992, p. 1294.
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nuclear export problem associated with Iraq. The provisions
in the agreement required the state receiving nuclear exports
(materials, equipment, technology) to: pledge not to use them
for the manufacture of nuclear explosives, accept open-ended
safeguards on all nuclear imports, provide sufficient security
against theft and/or sabotage, agree not to transfer these
imports to a third party without the original exporter's
agreement, employ restraint with sensitive items, and
encourage multilateral regional processing and enrichment
facilities
.
The Iraqis, and some of the exporters that contributed to
Iraq's attempted nuclear build-up, violated some of the above
guidelines, except the final one regarding regional
facilities, during the 1980s. Although the creation of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group demonstrated that the international
community understood the need to control exports that could
have nuclear weapons applications, the ease with which the
Iraqis bypassed these guidelines illustrates the need for more
stringent rules and enforcement . The export control system
has since been updated. The most prominent example of this is
the April 1992 Nuclear Suppliers Agreement which added sixty-
five dual-use items to the list of exports which cannot be
shipped unless certain conditions are met. One of these
Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear
Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990
,
(Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990), p. 435.
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conditions is that full-scope safeguards must be applied to
the nation that is receiving the item. Actions such as this




David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Quest for the
Nuclear Grail: What can we Learn," Arms Control Today
,
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IV. THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF IRAQ
Before addressing the strategic .culture of Iraq, it is
necessary to define strategic culture. For the purposes of
this thesis Yitzhak Klein's definition will be used:
Strategy is a goal-oriented endeavor, involving the
pursuit of a political objective through the use of force.
Our purpose is to examine how strategic culture influences
this goal-oriented activity. From this stems our
definition of strategic culture: "the set of attitudes and
beliefs held within a military establishment concerning
the political objective of war and the most effective
strategy and operational method for achieving it."'
This definition is appropriate to the Iraqi case because
the military establishment is very much in control in Iraq,
and historically the military has maintained a very strong
role. In order to determine the attitudes and beliefs held by
this establishment, many factors will be examined. First of
all, the history of the area that has become the Republic of
Iraq will be discussed. This will include a study of Iraq
from the time that Mesopotamia was the "cradle of
civilization, " through the coming of Islam, continuing with
the Mongol invasion, the Ottoman empire, colonial British
rule, the British-imposed monarchy, and the revolution of 1958
that eventually led to Ba'th Party rule.
Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture,",
omparative Strategy , Vol 1, 19 91, p. 5.
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A second factor that will be discussed is the demographics
of Iraq. Power has been held in the hands of the Sunni
minority since the fall of the monarchy in 1958, even though
Iraq is the only Arab state that has more Shi ' a than Sunni
Muslims. The Sunni leadership must also face the Kurdish
people in the north, a nation which shares the Sunni faith,
but feels that it has closer ties to Kurdish peoples in other
countries (such as Turkey) than to the central government of
Iraq. Indeed, the Kurds would like to establish an
independent nation-state of Kurdistan. There are also a few
Christians and Jews in Iraq, with little political influence.
Next, regional considerations will be examined. In the
case of Iraq, this topic cannot be discussed without including
Iran and Israel. Iran is important because of its relative
size, resources, and proximity, and because of its hostility
towards Iraq. These two nations concluded a bloody eight-year
war in 1988, and the historical Arab-Persian animosity
remains, as it has for centuries. Israel, for religious and
other reasons, has been a target of most of the Arab world
since that state's inception in 1948, and Iraq, under Saddam
Hussein, has taken a special interest in the destruction of
Israel. Given the fact that Israel reportedly has a
significant nuclear arsenal"', any action that Iraq might




take in pursuing the destruction of Israel could have dire
consequences
.
Finally, the Ba ' th party and the man that currently heads
it, Saddam Hussein, will be discussed. The nationalist-
socialist Ba'th party has been in power in Iraq since 1963,
after a series of political upheavals, including the
revolution of 1958, placed it in a position to gain control.
The party has its genesis in Syria in 1944, and was founded by
Sunni Muslims and Christians. Since Saddam Hussein came to
power in 1979 at the head of this party, he has led his nation
with an iron hand. In the present context, he alone
determines his nation's policy. No other individual has the
power to dispute his decisions. Therefore, an understanding
of this man's thinking is necessary in an analysis of the
strategic culture of Iraq today. His intense desire to
fulfill his self -declared destiny of repeating the
accomplishments of Nebuchandnezzar , the biblical king of
Babylon who enslaved the Jews, has a strong effect on Iraqi
policy towards Israel.*
An analysis of the effects of each of these factors should
provide a deepened understanding of the strategic culture of
Iraq, and assist in determining the future of Iraq with regard
to its nuclear weapons program. The conclusion will include
an analysis of the probable future of Iraq's nuclear weapons
Timmerman, pp. 13-14.
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program, in view of the facts derived from the strategic
culture study.
A. PRE BA'THIST HISTORY
The area that is currently known as the Republic of Iraq
was created by the British in 1921, out of what had previously
been three different Ottoman provinces: Basra, Baghdad and
Mosul. ' Although this is the beginning of modern Iraq, in
order to understand the country it is necessary to recall the
ancient region of Mesopotamia, often referred to as the land
where civilization first began. Mesopotamia, a name which
translates to the land between the rivers, was first settled
in 6000 B.C. and is located in the basin between the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers.'- This location was both a blessing
and a curse to its inhabitants; the rivers supplied enough
fresh water to make the region one of the most fertile in the
Middle East, but their propensity to flood violently enough to
destroy entire villages made life in this area a risky
proposition at best. Once irrigation was introduced to this
region, however, civilizations began to develop. The first of
11 Amatzi Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the
Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-1969
,
(New York: St Martins,
19 91), p . 1 .
Helen Chapm Metz, ed . , Iraq: A Country Study ,
(Washington: U.S. Government, 1990), p. 3.
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these was the city of Sumer, founded in approximately 3000
B.C., and it was followed by Babylon and Assyria.'
One after the other these three cities, Sumer, Babylon,
and Assyria, dominated the region. Sumer was indigenously
ruled until roughly 2400 B.C., when a series of military
conquests began which still have an effect upon the strategic
culture of Iraq, as well as the rest of the Arab world. The
first of these conquests was led by Sargon I, from the city-
state of Akkad in northern Mesopotamia, and was followed two
hundred years later by the reign of the Guti. The Guti, a
mountain people from the East, were overthrown by the
Sumerians in roughly 2100 B.C. By 2000 B.C., however, Sumer
was no longer a major force, and Babylon began to achieve
preeminence
.
Babylonian power would last until 1600 B.C., and include
the reign of King Hammurabi, who created one of the most
complete legal codes of ancient culture. Babylon would
eventually be destroyed by the Hittites, an Indo-European
tribe, and the Kassites^, and these groups would hold power
until roughly 1200 B.C. During this period the Assyrians
began to assert themselves, and by 800 B.C. they occupied
Babylon and Syria. The Assyrians maintained an iron-hand rule
until 600 B.C., a period that saw the reascension of Babylon
under the rule of Nebuchadnezzer , a king who destroyed
Samuel Noah Kramer, The Cradle of Civilization , (New
York: Time, 19 67), pp. 6,7.
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Jerusalem and enslaved the Jewish people in 586 B.C."
Babylon would remain a power until its defeat by the Persians
in the sixth century B.C.
This began a period of Indo-European rule in Iraq that
lasted 1200 years. The Persians gave way to the Macedonians
under Alexander the Great in 331 B.C. Macedonian rule was
followed by that of the Parthians and the Sassanids, from
Turkey and Iran respectively. The Parthians ruled from 126
B.C. to A.D. 227, and the Sassanids controlled the
Mesopotamian region from that year until A.D. 637. This
period ended with the region devastated by warfare, and the
Sassanids eventually fell to the next great power in the
region, the Muslims from Arabia.
The Muslims arose in the sixth century A.D. (The subject
of the emergence of Islam will be covered in more detail in
the demographic section of this chapter.) The forces of Islam
swept into Iraq and forced out the Sassanids in 637 . Most of
the occupants of Iraq at this time were Christians, and these
peoples were left to their own devices after the invasion, as
long as they remained submissive and paid the tax required of
all non-Muslims living within the confines of Muslim rule.
This Arab-Muslim rule continued until the twelfth century,
when the Mongol expansion finally reached Baghdad. Mongol
rule lasted until the fifteenth century, and its most striking
" Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq
,
(New York:
Russell and Russell, 1935), p. 6.
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legacy was the destruction of the agricultural infrastructure
of the river valley. This led to a cessation of the urban-
centered way of life in Mesopotamia, and a resumption of a
divided, tribal society.
The Ottoman empire was the next foreign ruler of the
region, from 1534 to 1918. This period left two indelible
marks on Iraqi society, both of which affect strategic culture
directly. The first was the continuation of the external rule
that the area now known as Iraq has experienced throughout
most of its history, and which has encouraged the development
of a politically passive society. The second involved the
placement of Sunni Muslims, as opposed to the more numerous
Shi ' a Muslims, in most positions of power. Istanbul saw Iraq
as a shield against the more radical Shi ' a regimes to the
south, and felt that by giving the Sunnis authority, this
purpose could be better served.' The tradition of Sunni
dominance has continued to this day, with the military
establishment (with which this thesis is very much concerned,
given the usage of Klein's definition of strategic culture)
dominated by the Sunni faction. This domination has been
maintained despite the fact that Iraq is the only Arab nation
with more Shi 'as than Sunnis.
Ottoman rule was shattered by the British in 1918, within
the context of World War I. The British had an important
'" Metz, p. 26.
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stake in Iraq for three primary reasons: oil, the pathway to
India, and the presence of British bases on Iraqi soil.'"
They understood that they could not rule Iraq from London, so
a monarchy was put in place in that country that appeared to
be acceptable to the British and the Iraqi people. Amir
Faisal, who had led the Arab forces that fought alongside the
British in Palestine against the Ottoman Turks, v/as selected
as Iraq's first king. This monarchy remained in power until
1958, when it was overthrown by a coalition of military and
political opposition.
Many factors contributed to the end of the monarchy.
World War II saw a major expansion of the Iraqi economy, and
with it a labor movement that was perceived as, and perhaps
was, communist in origin. The regime reacted harshly to this
movement, ordering police to fire upon demonstrators and
meetings on several occasions. The worst example of this was
on 27 January 1948, when 400 demonstrators were killed.'
Actions such as this began to foment anti-regime feelings
throughout the country. Iraq was beginning to become a powder
keg ready to explode. As the war in Palestine erupted in
1948, anti-British sentiments began to grow even stronger, and
this translated into increased anti-regime feelings. Events
Mohammad A. Tarbush, The Role of the Military in
Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941
,
(London: KPI , 1942),
p. 31.
Marion Farouk-Slugget and Peter Slugget, Iraq Since
195 8, (London: KPI, 1987), p. 40.
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outside Iraq influenced Iraqi public opinion in the following
years, including the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951
and Nasser's defiance of the British in 1956.
'
a Anti-British
demonstrations began to sprout up in Baghdad and other Iraqi
urban areas, and this resulted in martial law in 1956. The
army itself began to reflect anti-British and anti-regime
sentiments, and this was the final piece of the puzzle needed
for the destruction of the monarchy. The next two years
seemed to be quiet, but in 1958 a military coup deposed and
murdered King Feisal II and placed Prime Minister Kassem in
power
.
Kassem's rule, which lasted from 1958 to 1963, saw two
important events which would greatly affect the future of
Iraq's foreign policy. First, relations with the Soviet Union
were expanded, and Russian aid was accepted. This created a
Russo-Iraqi "friendship" that would last until the 1980s.
Kassem's second contribution to Iraqi history was his 1961
claim to Kuwait, an action which would be repeated by Saddam
Hussein some thirty years later. In 1963 Kassem was
overthrown and murdered by the army and the Ba'th party, and
replaced by an unstable regime that would only last five
years. The Ba'th party consolidated its power in 1968 via a
Ibid., p. 43. The nationalization of Iranian oil led
to calls for Iraq to do likewise, and Nasser's efforts to
repel the French and British in their efforts to "protect" the
canal, gave the Iraqis confidence that they too could resist
European powers
.
bloodless coup which deposed then-President Aref and replaced
him with President Al Bakr
.
How does this history affect the strategic culture of
today ' s Iraq?
• The country has spent most of its existence under foreign
rule of some type, from the conquest by the Persians in
the sixth century B.C., to the British, who created an
independent monarchy, but stayed deeply involved in Iraqi
affairs until the revolution of 1958. The citizens of
this country became bystanders in relation to the
formation of the national government, and as a result
turned towards the family and the tribe. This
disaffection has led to a tendency of passivity toward the
government, with involvement in public life limited to the
family, and has resulted in a strong central government
without opposition. This enables the military
establishment to act as it desires, with no constraints
from the populace. As a result, some actions by the
outside world that are intended to promote popular
dissatisfaction, such as the current economic embargo,
have no effect on the governing regime.
• Biblical accounts of Nebuchanezzer also have an effect
upon the Iraqi military establishment, most obviously
through its head, Saddam Hussein. The leadership of Iraq
sees the reenslavement of the Jews (and the destruction of
Israel) as its destiny, and therefore a primary policy
goal
.
• The above factors have promoted a feeling of hatred
towards two of Iraq's closest neighbors: Iran and Israel.
The long Persian dominance over what is today Iraq, and
Israel's continued existence, are constant thorns in the
side of the military establishment in Iraq. Saddam
Hussein's father once wrote a pamphlet with a title that
was self-explanatory: Three God Should Not Have Made:
Persians, Jews and Flies . 1 ' The hatred directed against
the Persians resulted in the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, and
Israel has been a target of Iraq since its creation.
• Perhaps the almost constant conquest and control of Iraq




culture of Iraq: the leadership seems to have great
feelings of insecurity, plus ambitions to demonstrate its
capacity to dominate others. This could explain why Iraq
has diverted such a large amount of its national resources
towards a military build-up, encompassing both
conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. The
leadership in Iraq could be attempting to gain respect
from the rest of the world through its military might.
Iraq is a nation that has had almost its entire history
(in a long term perspective) dictated by foreign powers,
and its leadership may feel that it is time to enter the
world stage as an independent, powerful force.
B. DEMOGRAPHICS
Iraq is a country of several ethnic groups, from the Kurds
in the north to the Shi 'as in the south, and the impact that
this has upon Iraq's strategic culture is significant. The
military establishment is controlled by the minority Sunni
Muslim faction, as it has been since the time of the Ottoman
empire, and this faction has led with an iron fist. The Kurds
and the Shi 'as have both shed a lot of blood as a result of
the Sunni attempts to hold and consolidate power. The
breakdown of religious and ethnic groups within Iraq is as
follows : l01 »
Shi ' a Arabs (concentrated south of Baghdad) 55%
Sunni Arabs (Baghdad, central/central northern Iraq) 20%
Kurds (mountainous northern Iraq) 17t20%
Christians and Jews (throughout) 5%
The information contained within the table was
collected from Amatzia Baram, pp. 3-5.
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Others under 2.5%
Sunni Arabs hold most positions of power in Iraq, despite
the fact that they only comprise 20% of the population, as the
table above indicates. The Ottomans contributed to this fact
by placing Sunnis in these positions during their rule, due to
their fear of the spread of Shia Muslims into Asia Minor and
their perceived need for a Sunni buffer state. 1 " - The Sunni
became Ottoman surrogates, with better education and career
prospects than the other ethnic groups within Iraq. This
trend continued under the British, and the British-imposed
monarchy of 1921 was Sunni-led. There are two important facts
about the Sunni power base that must be discussed. First, it
excludes the Kurds, despite the fact that the majority of
Kurds are Sunni. Secondly, the power is concentrated in the
hands of a small portion of Sunnis, such as a family or tribe.
In the present context the town of Tikrit, a small town north
of Baghdad, is the birthplace of most individuals in power
positions within Iraq.
The Shi 'as are the most populous ethnic group within Iraq,
and Iraq is the only country in the Arab world with this
demographic characteristic. The Shi 'as have nonetheless been
underrepresented in the Iraqi power sphere for centuries . Two
factors have contributed to this, and both have already been
mentioned in this chapter: the foreign empowerment of Sunnis
Metz, p. 26
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and the political passivity of the Shi 'as and most other
Iraqis. The iron-handed rule of Saddam Hussein can also be
introduced into this equation as a factor, and his strikes
against the Shi ' a in the south during and after the Iraq-Iran
war could be considered as a reason why the Shi ' a have not
risen to positions of power. Given the Shi'as' position of
weakness and political passivity prior to Hussein's actions,
however, it is doubtful that this action has been a major
factor in Shi ' a underrepresentation
.
Another factor that must be considered is the presence of
a Shi ' a power base in neighboring Iran. Although at first
glance it would seem that this would increase the danger to
the Sunni controlled military establishment from within Iraq,
the Shi ' a controlled Iranian government is considered
extremist by the Shi 'a factions within Iraq. This, along with
the historical Persian-Arab hatred that exists between the
people of these two countries, reduces, or possibly
eliminates, the possibility of an Iranian-led Shi'a coup in
Iraq. This leads to the conclusion that although the Shi'as
are the only sectarian group that outnumber the Sunnis in
Iraq, they are not considered the primary threat to the Sunni
power base.
The most prominent internal threat to Sunni domination
over the Republic of Iraq is the Kurds in the north. The
Kurdish challenge arises from the desire of the Kurds to
establish an autonomous state of Kurdistan consisting of the
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Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq, Iran and Turkey. In recent
years this issue has gained international prominence as a
result of Kurdish cooperation with Iran during the last five
years of the Iran-Iraq war, and the consequent chemical
warfare tactics that Saddam Hussein used against Iraqi
Kurds.' The Kurds in Iraq assisted the Iranians because
they felt that an Iranian victory would give them an
excellent chance to create a unified Kurdistan state.' '
Operation "Provide Comfort" in northern Iraq is designed to
protect Kurdish refugees from the military might of Saddam
Hussein. Although the Kurds were granted the right to rule
their region autonomously in the 1970 Iraqi constitution, the
Ba ' th party never honored this agreement. The Kurds will
continue to be a thorn in the side of the Iraqi leadership
well into the future, but international pressure to avoid the
establishment of a unified Kurdistan, because of the obvious
objections of Turkey, will probably prevent the Kurds from
reaching their goal.
This ethnic diversity has contributed to the Iraqi
strategic culture in three major ways:
• The hostile ethnic groups give the Sunnis and the Ba'th
party abundant "cannon fodder" for attempted conquests.
By stocking the lesser military units with these ethnic
1 o i Ibid., p. 202
The Kurds in Iran, however, supported the Iraqis
during this war because they felt that Iraqi victory was the
key to Kurdish reunification. Therefore the chances for a
unified Kurdistan were greatly diminished.
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groups, Hussein has a substantial supply of expendable
manpower, while stocking the elite fighting units, such as
the Republican Guard, with Sunnis . This maintains the
supremacy of the Sunnis within the military, while not
restricting the human resources available to it. 1
The presence of a hostile Kurdish faction in the north,
coupled with the reality of active Kurds in Turkey and
Iran, presents the Iraqi leadership with a permanent
security threat to its northern territory. Baghdad has
chosen to deal with this problem through suppression, and
this has led to international involvement in that area.
The Iraqis know that the problem will remain, and this
leaves this area in crisis, particularly during wars.
Twice in the last decade Iraq has been at war, and both
times the Kurds attempted to take advantage of an external
threat to gain their independence. Therefore, the Sunnis
must always ensure that this area is secure both prior to,
and during, hostilities with a foreign power. This can be
exemplified by the toleration of greater Kurdish autonomy
during the Iran-Iraq war, because a harsh stand would have
led to a conflict in the north at a time when the Iraqis
were tied down in a major war with Iran.- The
government in Baghdad must always consider its actions
towards Kurdistan during wartime, or a strategically
costly second front could result.
In developing strategies for war, the Iraqi military
establishment must deal with the internal factor to a
greater extent than the United States and European
nations. Due to the intermingling of many hostile ethnic
and religious groups, the threat of domestic upheaval is
present at all times in Iraq.
C. REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Middle East is one of the most unstable and volatile
regions in the world, in part due to the actions of Iraq. The
primary players in this region include Iran, Iraq, Israel,
' Metz, p. 96. Although the vast majority of the Iraqi




Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Iraq has conducted military strikes
against three of these nations, as well as Kuwait, in the last
ten years, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Syria, the
remaining important Arab player, is the birthplace of the
Ba ' th Party, which currently rules Iraq.
Iran was at war with Iraq for eight years, from 1980-88,
and this war left Iraq as the primary Arab conventional
military power in the Middle East. This war was the result of
many factors, including religious differences (Sunnis-
Shi'as), Persian-Arab animosities, and the political question
of borders. These problems existed before the war, and they
still exist today. The carnage created by the war should deter
the two countries from going to war again in the near future,
however. Hussein expected a quick and decisive war when he
began hostilities with Iran in 1980, and hoped to replace Iran
as the major power in the Persian Gulf.
Above all, Iraq launched the war in an effort to
consolidate its rising power in the Arab world and to
replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. Phebe
Marr, a noted analyst of Iraqi affairs, stated that "the
war was more immediately the result of poor political
judgement and miscalculation on the part of Saddam
Hussein," and "the decision to invade, taken at a moment
of Iranian weakness, was Saddam's. "-
Iran's ability to drag the Iran-Iraq war out to an eight
-
year conflict is a direct reflection of the fanatic,
fundamentalist government that led the country, embodied by
the Ayatollah Khomeini. Despite the fact that Iranian war
11,7 Ibid.
, p 232 .
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equipment was in disrepair due to a lack of American
maintenance and the decimation of the highly trained officer
corps through execution, the Iranians drove back early Iraqi
gains and forced the war into a stalemate from 1982-87. The
war of attrition was a direct consequence of the Iranian
willingness to use a human wave tactic to lead offensives.
This tactic involved sending unarmed children and senior
citizens through minefields and towards machine guns in groups
of thousands, and resulted in immense casualties, averaging
twice that of the Iraqi casualties. 1 Iran had the
population to sustain such a pace, however, and this tactic
forced the Iraqis to resort to chemical warfare in order to
hold off the Iranians. The Iraqis pursued a peace settlement
from 1982 on, but were not able to gain such a settlement
until 1988. Although the current leadership in Tehran is
considered more moderate than its predecessor, the Iraqis must
still deal with an historically hostile state willing to take
immense casualties on its eastern border.
Another important regional power in the Middle East is
Israel. There are three primary reasons for Israel's
importance in Iraqi eyes. First of all, there is the legacy
of Nebuchanezzer , the Babylonian king that enslaved the Jews
in biblical accounts. This is addressed in the later section
on Saddam Hussein. Secondly, Israel seems to be the foe
Ibid, p. 235.
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around whom the Iraqis feel all Arab nations can be united.
This was evident in Iraqi statements after Israel's raid on
Osirak in 1981:
The Israeli attack on Thuwaitha proved once again that
"the Zionist entity is thus the sworn enemy of the Arab
Nation and of Iraq." Faced with Israeli aggression,
"every nation that is truly seeking peace and security and
that honestly respects freedom and the independence of
peoples should help the Arabs in one way or another to
acquire the atomic bomb, so that they can confront the
real atomic bombs the Zionist entity possesses."' 1
This statement reflects the view that the raid on Osirak was
not an attack against Iraq, but rather an attack against the
entire Arab nation.
The third factor stems directly from the above quotation,
the widespread judgement that the Israelis possess nuclear
weapons. This reported nuclear weapons capability makes
Israel important in all Iraqi military decisions involving
that part of the world.
Iran and Israel are the only neighboring countries which
could pose a serious military threat to Iraq, but other
nations in the region are important to the Iraqi military
establishment. Saudi Arabia's close ties to the United States
give U.S. forces a staging platform from which to act against
Iraq in times of conflict, as demonstrated in Desert Storm.
This friendship also prevents Iraq from acting directly
against Saudi Arabia because of fear of risking retaliation
Stated on 31 June 1981 by Saddam Hussein, cited in
Timmerman,p. 103-104.
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from the United States. Kuwait is also a factor in Iraqi
decisions, given its rich oil reserves and perceived
vulnerability. The Iraqis first attempted to declare Kuwait
a province of Iraq in 1961, and their 1990 action to enforce
this statement led to the Gulf War.
These regional considerations affect Iraqi strategic
culture in different ways:
• The threat of a large hostile power, willing to take
tremendous casualties to achieve victory, in the form of
Iran to the east of Iraq, forces the Iraqis to seek means
other than direct battlefield confrontation with which to
wage war. If the fight could be fought without having to
face these human waves (in other words, if the fight could
be taken directly to Tehran) , then the disadvantage that
Iran's population superiority presents to the Iraqi
leadership could be circumvented. This is a reason for
Iraq's pursuit of ballistic missiles, modern military
strike aircraft, and NBC weapons.
• The reported presence of nuclear weapons in the state of
Israel affects Iraqi strategic culture in three major
ways. First of all, it prevents Iraq from acting
decisively against Israel. For example, the Iraqis may
have been deterred from striking Israel with chemical
weapons during the Gulf War because of a fear of nuclear
retaliation. Secondly, the reported Israeli nuclear
arsenal gives Iraq's leadership an "excuse" to pursue
nuclear weapons for their own country.
• The mere existence of Israel has effects upon the Iraqi
leadership above and beyond the significance of the
reported Israeli nuclear arsenal. The Nebuchanezzer
legacy still lives in modern Iraq, creating a situation
where a major foreign policy goal of Iraq is the
destruction of the state of Israel. 1 ' The presence of
Israel is also a major rallying point for Baghdad's call
for pan-Arabism, with Iraq as the lead country, of course.
• The combination of Iran to the east and Israel to the west
has also led the military establishment in Iraq to fear
conspiracy between those two nations against it. This
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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fear is historically supported by alleged Jewish support
of Cyrus the Great (a Persian who liberated the
Israelites) in his quest to conquer Babylon in 539 BC. n:
Israel did indeed sell arms to the Iranians during the
Iran-Iraq war, and this action served to foster Iraq's
fears that the two were joining forces to destroy it. 112
Saudi and Kuwaiti relations with the United States also
give the Iraqi military establishment cause for concern.
As was evident during the Gulf War, the Iraqis cannot take
action against other countries in their region without
considering possible intervention by external powers, such
as the United States. This, of course, adds another
factor to the regional military equation. The Iraqis must
not only deal with the military powers in their region,
but also contend with the power of nations far removed
from that region. This complicates the overall threat
equation in the region, and should deter, to some extent,
Iraqi offensive actions against other Arab countries.
D. THE BA'TH PARTY
The Ba ' th party was born in 1944 in Syria, under the
leadership of Sunnis and Christians. Its birth and growth
were the result of two primary factors: a disillusionment
with current "older" Arab leadership, and a desire to throw
off the European "imperialist" yoke." The older Arab
leadership was seen as responsible for Arab defeats in
Palestine, and the French were the European "imperialists" in
question occupying Syria. The Ba ' th party first appeared in
Iraq in 1949, and obtained leadership through a coup in 1968.
The primary tenet of the party is Pan-Arabism:
Baram, p . 110
.
Timmerman, p. 141
m Slugget, p. 87
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The party's most important principle was that of Arab
unity (al-wahda al- ' arabiyya) , which envisioned the
political unification of all the Arab lands - from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf, (or, in Ba ' th
vernacular: The Gulf of Basra) and from the Taurus
mountains in the north to the Indian Ocean to the south -
whereby the Arabs would rise from the ashes and fulfil a
worldwide 'eternal mission' (risala khalida) of
civilization and enlightenment... Arab nationalism was
perceived. . . in terms of language, culture and
history. [lA
In historical context, the Ba ' th party is very similar to
both the German Nazi party and the Communist Party of the
former Soviet Union. Its similarities to Nazism include hero
worship, racism, and faith in war as "purification".- 1 " It
is believed that a single man will arise and bring the entire
Arab world together under the flag of Islam (hero worship) .
This single nation will then drive out all non-Muslims,
exterminating those that remain (racism), and then strike out
at the world as a new superpower, ethnically and religiously
cleansing it (purifying war)
.
The Ba ' th party similarities to the Communist Party
include an inclination towards socialism (a theme shared with
Nazism) and single-party organization. An article from the
Party's constitution can demonstrate the socialist aspect:
The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a socialist party. It
believes that socialism is a necessity which emanates from
the depth of Arab nationalism itself. Socialism
constitutes in fact the ideal social order which will
allow the Arab people to realize its possibilities and to
allow its genius to flourish, and which will ensure for





the nation constant progress in its material and moral
output. It makes possible a trustful brotherhood amongst
its members . " '
The organization of the party and its relationship to
government is similar to the Soviet model in that one party
rule, with the government subservient to the Ba'th, is the
party's doctrine. 1 Tikrit stranglehold on the Ba'th sets
it apart from the Soviet example, however.
The Ba'th party is almost completely dominated by the
village of Tikrit, a small village north of Baghdad on the
Tigris river. When the Ba'th gained power in 1968, most of
the top political and military figures were from Tikrit, and
many of these were related to each other in some way. 1
This is a result of two factors, the first being the feelings
of political passivity and disaffection from the state
mentioned in the historical section of this chapter. The
second factor is a direct reflection of the first: the lack
of a binding ideology." Since the concept of Socialism
cannot be persuasive in a society of people that do not view
the state as a vital part of their lives, this ideology could
not bind the country, or a group within the country, together
"The Party of the Arab Ba'th: Constitution," in
Sylvia Haim, ed . , Arab Nationalism; an Anthology , (London:
Berkeley, 1962), pp. 23-41.
117 Baram, p. 10.
11B Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab
World
,
(Washington: Brookings, 1984), p. 127.
119 Metz, p. 53
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to the degree needed for a strong party presence. Therefore,
the only bond available was that of village and family
cliques, and that village happened to be Tikrit.
The contributions to Iraqi strategic culture are rather-
straight forward
:
• The racist portion of the Ba'th platform (that is, a
driving out of non-Muslims and the extermination of those
that might remain) precludes the existence of the state of
Israel. This helps to explain the military
establishment's preoccupation with that state, and its
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in order to assist in
the elimination of Israel.
• The idea of hero worship in Ba'thist doctrine explains the
preeminence of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Hussein wants to
project himself as the figure who will unite the Arab
world, drive the Jewish people out of the Middle East, and
lead a new Arab nation on the road to conquest . This was
a rationale behind the invasion of Kuwait.
• The concept of purifying war is also a driving force
behind the pursuit of a nuclear weapon by the military
establishment in Iraq. If the united Arab nation is to
conquer the world, it must be able to match the weapons of
mass destruction possessed by the nuclear powers.
• The domination of the party by a single village (Tikrit),
and concentration of the military establishment therein,
places the party in a constant internal power struggle
between the clique in power and those that wish to obtain
power. This also creates a situation where those that may
be considered criminals in another society, due to their
violent nature, can obtain power in the entire country
simply by fighting their way into a position of power in
their village. When the politics of a village are thrust
into the national scene, the results can be, as they are
in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, "thug rule." 1 "
"Thug rule" implies a situation like that of Germany
after the Nazi acquisition of power, when it was said in some
circles that the street gangs were in control of the
government. This is one more factor that makes Ba'th rule in
Iraq comparable to Nazi rule in Germany in 1933-45.
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The primary tenet of the Ba'thist doctrine, Pan-Arabism,
has a major impact; upon the strategic decisions of the
military establishment in Iraq. The pressure is upon
Baghdad to set an example of leadership within the Arab
community. This contributes to two self-imposed hurdles
that the Iraqis must always clear in their foreign policy
moves: actions must be strong and aggressive, and Baghdad
must lead the Arab world in the acquisition of nuclear
weapons. The first factor can be demonstrated by Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait and its reluctance to back down under
threats from the U.N. coalition, and the second can be
exemplified by Baghdad's reluctance to cooperate fully
regarding its nuclear weapons program in dealings with
U.N. inspection teams.
E. SADDAM HUSSEIN
The military establishment in Iraq is totally controlled
by one man, and the study of that man's thinking is necessary
if the strategic culture of this country is to be understood.
Saddam was born in the birthplace of most of the Ba'th party
"elite", Tikrit, in 1937. He was raised by his uncle,
Khairallah al-Tulfah, who bore a strong hatred for the British
and an intense respect for the Germans and their leader during
World War Two, Adolf Hitler. ljl Both of these feelings were
transferred to Hussein, and would eventually have a strong
bearing upon his future, leading him to join the Ba'th party
in 1956. Hussein, along with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, gained
control of the Revolutionary Command Council in 1968. :" At
this point al-Bakr controlled the reins of power in Iraq, but
Hussein's position within the RCC was similar to that of
-• Timmerman, p. 1
Farouk, p. 12 9
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Stalin prior to his acquisition of power. All positions of
power were subject to Hussein's approval; if he wanted someone
removed from the party, it was done. Al-Bakr remained in
power until his resignation in July 1979, and at this point
Saddam Hussein became president. By this time most positions
of power were held by members of the Talfah family of
Tiknt.'- Hussein's brother-in-law, General Adnan Khayr
Allah Talfah, had become minister of defense; the cabinet was
stocked with family members, through both blood and marital
ties. The first test of this family-led government would be
the Iran-Iraq War.
This war was partly the result of a personality clash
between the Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein, and was the
first example of what Hussein's leadership would bring to the
region: increased instability. Within a year-and-a-half of
gaining power, Hussein had already gone on the offensive
against another nation, demonstrating the overconf idence and
poor judgement that would mark his rule.'""1 Hussein expected
a quick victory over the Iranians, given the instability in
that nation, but he was in for a protracted eight-year
conflict that would demonstrate the lengths to which the Iraqi
leader was willing to go to obtain his goals. First of all,
Hussein was willing to use chemical weapons not only against
;j: Metz, p. 59.
•- 4 The first Iraqi air offensives began on 22 September
1980, fourteen months after Hussein gained power.
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foreign troops, but also against Iraqi citizens, as
demonstrated at Halabja:
In a particularly infamous March 1988 episode in the town
of Halabja, Iraqi forces killed hundreds, and possibly
thousands, of Iraqi Kurdish civilians with chemical
weapons, apparently in retaliation for their having sided
with Iran when the latter gained control of the area
during an earlier phase of the conflict. In September
1988, when Iraqi Kurds openly revolted against the Hussein
regime in a bid for independence, Iraqi forces again used
chemical weapons extensively in the ensuing campaign
against the rebels, causing widespread civilian casualties
according to many reports. " 1_r
Secondly, Hussein was willing to forego feeding his
population and repaying his debts not only in order to win a
conflict, but also to continue building his military might
after the conclusion of the war. By the end of 1988, Iraq was
having difficulty repaying foreign debts due to its increasing
arms purchases. This situation caused foreign banks to cease
loans to Baghdad for fear of default, and also left the Iraqi
government in the position of having to choose between using
its hard currency for arms purchases or on farm commodities.
The United States eventually rescued the Iraqis from this
situation by extending $1 billion in farm credits to the Iraqi
leader. 1 - Hussein, however, was obviously pursuing the same
goal he was pursuing when he attacked Iran: turning Iraq into
the most powerful nation in the Persian Gulf. To Saddam, this
--'- Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions
,
p. 189.
Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Secret U.S. aid to
Iraq in '89 cited," Los Angeles Times , 23 February 1992, p.
12A.
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was important, because if he was to be the "hero" that united
the Arab world under the flag of Islam, he had to be in
control of the most powerful state in the Arab world.
Although the war with Iran lasted eight years, this is not
the only example of aggressiveness demonstrated by Saddam.
First of all, Hussein has always been preoccupied with the
destruction of Israel. This can be ascribed to his desire to
fulfill his self -proclaimed role as the 20th century
Nebuchanezzer . Hussein announced that he was a descendant of
this "Iraqi" figure, and said that he too would bring the
Jewish people into Babylon in captivity, and this time there
would be no Cyrus to free them.
Saddam Hussein was driven by no ordinary vision. Again
and again he would refer back to Nebuchdnezzar , the
biblical king of Babylon. His favorite episode in the
saga was when Nebuchadnezzer brought the Jews into
captivity in Babylon, he hoped to repeat that feat. 1 '
Another example of this leader's overconf idence and
aggressive nature is his attack upon Kuwait in August 1990.
Under the veil of claiming Kuwait as the 19th province of
Iraq, Hussein made a bid for the land which would have shifted
the balance of power in the region in Iraq's direction, given
the large percentage of oil Baghdad would control . The only
factor that stopped this, and possible future, Iraqi
aggression was the intervention of the United Nations, led by
the United States of America.
Timmerman, p. 13-14.
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Another factor of Hussein's persona that must be examined
is his desire to create a cult of personality around himself:
Saddam was intent on becoming the new Saladin, the Muslim
warrior who drove the Christian Crusaders out of the Holy
Land in the twelfth century... Saddam Hussein had built
himself up into a larger-than-life figure, whose portrait
dominated every public square, every street corner, every
living room in Iraq. There was Saddam Hussein the devout
Muslim, kneeling to pray at the mosque; he was the Arab
warrior, making his triumphal entry into Jerusalem astride
his white horse, as Nebuchadnezzer had done before him; he
was the leader of the historic Qaddisiya battle to drive
out the Persian infidel, looming large over yet another
battlefield. The Iraqi leader was everywhere, in every
guise
In order to facilitate his deification, Hussein murdered those
around him that challenged his power, including members of his
family if need be. 1- ' Saddam's struggle to create a cult
around himself was used to consolidate and solidify his power,
through the forces of fear and respect. It has also been used
to cast him as the man that will bring the Arab world
together, and lead it to its "proper place in the world, " i.e.
superpower status
.
How do these factors concerning Saddam Hussein affect
Iraq's strategic culture?
• Hussein's overconf idence and aggressive nature have been
transferred to the military establishment. Iraq's actions
in Iran, Kuwait and towards Israel are direct reflections
of Saddam's psyche, in combination with Iraqi historical
factors. This direct relationship between Saddam's psyche
and Iraqi policy can be attributed to the effectiveness of
-~ : Ibid .
, p . 115 .
This included the death of Hussein's brother-in-law in
a mysterious helicopter accident that is attributed to
Saddam's treachery. See Timmerman, p. 345 for details.
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Saddam's cult of personality campaign, as well as the
political passivity of the Iraqi people.
Hussein's desire to become the "hero" figure that unites
the Arab world has led Baghdad to seek to acquire nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. As previously
discussed, if Hussein is to unite the Arab world and then
create a superpower out of this Pan-Arab nation, weapons
of mass destruction are necessary. An additional factor-
is Hussein's willingness to use these weapons, as
demonstrated against the Iranians and the Kurds. This
willingness, however, has not been demonstrated when the
target has appeared capable of responding in kind, as the
example of Israel during the Gulf War may indicate.
Although Hussein was willing to launch conventional
missiles against Israel, he did not proceed with chemical
weapon strikes against that nation. Two factors could
contribute to this unwillingness, one of which is a
possible lack of Iraqi ability to place chemical warheads
on missiles. The second possibility, fear of an Israeli
retaliation, demonstrates how Hussein may have been
deterred
.
A characteristic shared by many Arab leaders, an
unwillingness to show weakness at any time, can be
demonstrated by Hussein's actions in the Gulf War.
Although he was obviously overmatched, Saddam held his
ground and fought. Given the dynamics of Iraqi politics,
he realized that backing down from the U.N. coalition
would lead to his overthrow and, most probably, his death.
Hussein's respect for Hitler, passed down from his uncle
when he was a child, does have some effect upon the
military establishment in Iraq. Hussein's use of the goal
of uniting the Arab world as a rationale for expanding his
own power could be compared to Hitler's efforts to unite
the Germans throughout Europe during World War Two.
Saddam's attempted fait accompli in Kuwait may also have
its roots in Hitler's policy in 1937-39; the rapid
reaction by the U.N., however, led to a very different
result in Hussein's case.
The fear created by Saddam's status as the focus of a cult
of personality is also a factor in the strategic culture
of Iraq. Disagreement with Hussein could lead to death
for some of his advisors. Therefore, they may not be
completely honest with him when they see a problem with
one of his strategic plans. Being surrounded by "yes" men
can result in the security of a nation becoming totally
dependent upon the judgement and knowledge of one man.
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F. CONCLUSION
The strategic culture of Iraq has been defined through
five factors: history, demographics, regional considerations,
the implications of Ba ' th Party rule, and the impact of Saddam
Hussein's leadership. History has left the country with a
passive population and a great sense of insecurity due to the
considerable time Iraq has spent under foreign rule, and with
a hatred of the Iranians and the Israelis. The demographic
situation implies a country constantly facing the threat of
domestic upheavals, owing in part to the independence
aspirations of the Kurds, but endowed with a large supply of
"expendable" manpower, at least from the viewpoint of Saddam
Hussein. The regional situation presents a powerful country
to the east in Iran, and a reported nuclear power to the west
in Israel. Iraq is also concerned about collaboration between
the two, and must factor in the impact of external powers such
as the United States. The Ba'th party brings racism, a desire
for a united Arab world, and the necessity for hero worship to
the equation. Party ruje also leaves a single ethnic group
from one village in control of the country, and the need for
"purifying" war in its doctrine implies a need for nuclear
weapons. The rule of Saddam Hussein gives Iraq an
overconfident, aggressive nature in its foreign policy
endeavors, as well as a focus for the hero worship tenet of
the Ba'th Party. It also leaves the country with a man in
power with a deep respect for Hitler, supported by a cult of
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personality, and with an inability to back down in an
international crisis.
What does this strategic culture mean with regard to the
future of Iraq's nuclear weapons program? Saddam's efforts to
preserve his nuclear weapons program have been apparent since
the end of the Gulf War, as he has used stalling techniques
and threats to hinder the inspection teams concentrating upon
these weapons. There are two primary reasons why Hussein is
stalling the U.N. teams. First, Saddam, as discussed in the
preceding section, is a man whose position of power is
dependent upon not showing weakness in any way, and he is
placed in a position of weakness by having to allow the
inspection teams inside his borders. The only way to offset
this is by making it as difficult as possible for these teams,
in an effort to prove he is still in control. Secondly, the
nuclear weapons program of Iraq is necessary if Hussein is
ike his "proper place in history" as the leader of a united
Arab nation, and if that Arab nation is to go forward in its
"purifying" war.
These two factors, along with the reported presence of
nuclear weapons in Israel, indicate that Iraq will continue to
pursue nuclear weapons. U.S. intelligence estimates state
that the Iraqis will technically be able to build nuclear
weapons within a "few years" after the departure of the U.N.
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inspection teams. uc The strategic situation, with
reportedly nuclear-armed Israel to the west and powerful Iran
to the east, gives the Iraqi nuclear program internal staying
power above and beyond the desires of Hussein.
Therefore, given the factors discussed in this chapter on
strategic culture, the cessation of the nuclear weapons
program in Iraq is extremely improbable. Unfortunately, it
seems that even removing the Ba ' th Party and its leader,
Saddam Hussein, from power would still leave Iraq with many
factors that would encourage nuclear weapons research to
continue
.
Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqis Could Pose a Threat Soon
C.I. A. Chief Says," p. A9
.
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The ongoing investigation of the nuclear capability of
Iraq by the U.N. Special Commission has demonstrated a very
serious shortcoming in the ability of the International Atomic
Energy Agency to achieve one of its primary goals: limiting
the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and
capability. The I.A.E.A., established in 1957, uses
inspections, audits, and inventory searches to prevent the
diversion of peaceful nuclear materials to weapons
programs.' The extensive degree to which the Iraqis
circumvented these safeguards, as the U.N. investigation has
revealed, indicates that the current non-proliferation regime
has serious shortcomings . There is now a need for new
barriers in order to protect the rest of the planet from the
unknown number of dictators, such as Saddam Hussein, who are
currently seeking nuclear weapons.
The United States and Western Europe must be at the
forefront of the effort to eliminate, or at the very least
minimize, this threat for a variety of reasons. The first of
these is that the nations of NATO may become more and more
likely to be within range of a hostile dictator armed with
nuclear missiles. Self-preservation dictates that these




nations must either develop a system to eliminate the
possibility of a hostile power deploying nuclear weapons, or
be prepared to defend themselves against such a threat . The
proliferation problem affects the security of these nations in
a very direct way, especially those nations on NATO's southern
flank. A second reason for these nations to involve
themselves is the political, economic, and military power that
NATO nations possess. A third reason for West European and
U.S. leadership in this struggle involves the contribution by
these nations to the very proliferation they are now
threatened by. In the case of Iraq, most of the technology,
training, and material the Iraqis received came from the
Europeans and the Americans.
This chapter will discuss the tools that must be used by
Europe, the United States, and other concerned nations in
order to contain the threat of nuclear proliferation. First,
intelligence and reconnaissance must be improved. This
involves both increasing the effectiveness of the present
system and diverting more assets to the areas affected. The
second tool to be considered is the existing non-proliferation
regime. This regime is currently made up of a series of
international agreements, the most important being the Non-
Prolif eration Treaty and the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Export controls and economic sanctions are the third
tool. These can be used to prevent a repetition of what
occurred in Iraq, where the nations that now seek to disarm
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Iraq have come to realize that their companies are the ones
that armed Iraq."
These tools must be used to accomplish four objectives
necessary for the overall goal of eliminating the threat that
proliferation represents. The first objective is to
discourage nations from desiring to possess nuclear arsenals.
If no non-nuclear state wants to own nuclear weapons, the
threat will be virtually eliminated. The second objective is
to prevent nations that desire nuclear weapons from obtaining
them. In this case, if such nations cannot obtain nuclear
weapons material, the threat can be diminished.
The third and fourth objectives are essentially necessary
if the first two are not met. Objective three is to deter, or
contain, the use of nuclear weapons by nations that obtain
them. A fourth conceivable objective, one that may be deemed
appropriate in some cases, is to destroy the nuclear capacity
of a nation that obtains nuclear weapons. If the nuclear
forces of a hostile power are destroyed _ before they are
brought to bear against another nation, the threat is
eliminated
.
~ See Timmerman for an extensive discussion of how
Western firms and governments assisted in Iraq's nuclear
weapons program.
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A. INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
Improved unilateral and joint intelligence is vital to the
goal of halting or slowing the spread of nuclear weapons in
the future
.
Perhaps the most important unilateral measure is the
gathering and analysis of intelligence. A much larger-
investment in targeting nonprolif erat ion is needed to
provide early warning and avoid the intelligence failures
evident in the Iraq case... There is an important
synergistic interaction between national intelligence
efforts and the international inspection system. National
intelligence can both verify the effectiveness of
international inspection and alert international
inspectors to problem areas. The effectiveness of the
U.N. special commission in Iraq depended heavily upon such
efforts
Even if joint efforts fail, national intelligence agencies
must step up their nuclear proliferation detection measures,
but simple manpower and budget increases are not sufficient to
the task. The focus of these assets must also be shifted,
away from a total concentration upon seeking signs of modern
technology such as the gas centrifuge, towards a recognition
of the relevance of older technologies such as the calutron.
Prior to August 2, 1990, the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait,
the extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was
unknown.'" Saddam Hussein, however, had made it clear as
early as September 1975 that he wanted to obtain a nuclear
m Nye, p. 12 98.
' 4 Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "Iraq and
Nuclear Weapons, " p. 1.
weapon. His stance was made clear in a statement he made
after the Iraqi government made a deal with France to purchase
the Osirak nuclear reactor. 13 "
"The agreement with France," Saddam declared, "is the
first concrete step toward the production of the Arab
atomic weapon."'
This should have made it obvious to U.S. and allied
intelligence that the Iraqis wanted nuclear weapons. The
question is, armed with such knowledge and given the extensive
industrial and military infrastructure that Iraq possessed,
why did the intelligence community not realize the extent of
Iraq's nuclear weapons program? The Iraqis' desire to possess
nuclear weapons, along with their advanced technological
infrastructure, should have been clear clues to the C.I. A. and
other intelligence organizations that there was a threat of
the Iraqis making a breakthrough in the area of nuclear
weapons that could have accelerated their nuclear timetable.
Given this knowledge, how far along did the intelligence
community conclude Iraq had travelled on the road to nuclear
weapons? According to one source, it was discovered that the
Iraqis were six months from possessing the technology
necessary to produce nuclear weapons as early as November of
1990. The Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly informed the
The Osirak reactor was destroyed by an Israeli
preemptive strike in 1981. The Israelis cited fears that the
reactor would be used to fabricate nuclear weapons.
Timmerman, p. 30.
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President of this fact in November of 1990. ; Following the
Gulf War, it was verified that Iraq was six months to three
years away from creating its first nuclear weapon, depending
on the source. 13 " Despite the alleged November 1990 DIA
report, most intelligence organizations in the United States
and abroad appeared surprised at how far along the Iraqi
nuclear weapons program had come. This raises a question
about whether these same intelligence organizations may be
mistaken about other nations that may be seeking nuclear
weapons, such as North Korea and Iran. If intelligence is
having difficulty keeping track of nuclear weapons progress in
non-nuclear weapons states, how can it be adjusted to deal
with this shortcoming?
First of all, even though the assets may be present to




[T]he C.I. A. had only one technical analyst responsible
for examining Iraq's nuclear program before the August
1990 invasion of Kuwait, and he had to monitor Japan as
well. The Defense Intelligence Agency had only two
analysts assigned to Iraq, but 42 to issues relating to
Americans missing in action in Southeast Asia...
satellites that had been devoted to the Iran-Iraq border
in the mid-1980's to help Iraq in its war against Iran




Ibid., p. ix. This source, however, was not supported
by documentary evidence in Timmerman's book.
. Nye, p. 1293
Elaine Sciolino, "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the
Holes in U.S. Intelligence," p. E5
.
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This demonstrates that nuclear proliferation in Iraq had a low
priority in the areas of both intelligence and reconnaissance,
despite the fact that Iraq had made its intentions regarding
nuclear weapons clear and possessed the infrastructure
necessary to reach its goal. If more assets could be shifted
to nations such as North Korea, Iran, Taiwan, and Libya
(nations v/ith the potential to repeat the example given by
Iraq) , the odds of a repetition of a situation like that in
Iraq regarding nuclear weapons could be diminished. This
seems to be a very attainable goal with the decline of the
Soviet Union, and the subsequent release of resources that
have heretofore been concentrated totally upon that country,
but this diversion in itself will not be enough to eliminate
the intelligence shortcomings. 1 " 1 '
A second step that could be taken in regard to
intelligence and reconnaissance involves jointness. If
Europe, the United States, and other concerned nations could
create a joint intelligence agency dedicated to the study of
nations seeking a nuclear weapons capability, such an
organization could perhaps be effective in detecting nuclear-
weapons development by non-nuclear nations. This organization
would have to be capable of going above and beyond the current
; Joseph F. Pilat, "Iraq and the Future of Nuclear
Nonprolif eration : The Roles of Inspections and Treaties,"
Science
,
3 April 1992, p. 1227.
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ability of the I.A.E.A., which is restricted by the provisions
included in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The primary limitation of the NPT regime is that it is a
political barrier, subject to political restrictions. In
order to get non-nuclear nations to sign, the treaty included
many concessions. These concessions include limitations upon
what facilities may be inspected.
...[T]he IAEA safeguards system has some well-recognised
limitations. First, and most important, key installations
in countries of proliferation concern including enrichment
and reprocessing facilities, are not under the IAEA
system. . . - 41
David Kay, the leader of many of the inspection teams into
Iraq and the Secretary General of the Uranium Institute,
demonstrated concern about the safeguards system. He has said
that there are inherent weaknesses in the NPT regime that
prevented it from discovering the extent of Iraq's nuclear
weapons program, and may prevent it from uncovering
clandestine nuclear activities in other nations. - ""
Thus, the I.A.E.A. is unable to inspect either
installations in nations that have not signed the NPT or the
undeclared installations of nations that are NPT signatories.
This weakness was exploited by the Iraqis in their bid for
nuclear weapons, and must be eliminated. A joint intelligence
141 Spector, Going Nuclear
, p. 337.
Kay, p. 2. Kay goes on to state that this inherent
weakness is due to the bargain struck when the NPT was signed
to allow only declared facilities to be subject to safeguards
in exchange for peaceful nuclear technological transfer.
agency might be able to overcome these barriers, and work
outside the limitations of the N.P.T. regime.
If a joint intelligence organization proves to be
politically or operationally impractical, the individual
nations should set up "blue ribbon" panels dedicated to
intelligence requirements involving nuclear proliferation.- 4 '
This could focus the assets required in the right direction to
improve the performance of the intelligence establishment
regarding proliferation.
Intelligence organizations must also widen the scope of
their investigations beyond the limits observed prior to the
Iraqi experience. Before Iraq's nuclear program was revealed
to its full extent, the C.I. A. and other organizations
searched for signs of nuclear weapons proliferation using what
Peter Lavoy has described as "ladder" logic. - " In other
words, they expected to see signs of development mirroring
that used by nations with established nuclear weapons
programs, such as the U.S. Using this method the West
believed that Thuwaitha,
,,
a site south of Baghdad on the Tigris
river, was the only confirmed site where nuclear research took
place
.
' Dunn, p . 33
.
144 Mr. Lavoy is a doctoral student at the University of
California at Berkeley studying nuclear proliferation. He
coined the term "ladder logic" during a lecture he gave at the
Naval Postgraduate School in February of 1992.
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The investigations that followed the Gulf War revealed ten
sites where nuclear research was taking place: Factory 10,
Amadiyan, Arbil, Ash Sharqat, Suleimaniyah, Makhour, Tarmiya,
Al Qaqaa, Abu Sukhayr, as well as Thuwaitha . 14C' The primary
reason that so many facilities were overlooked lay in the fact
that intelligence was not looking for the right signs of
nuclear development . Iraq had in many cases turned to the
calutron method, which is years behind current uranium
enrichment procedures, as well as being inefficient and
slow. 14 '" Apparently, none of the intelligence agencies that
monitor Iraq thought to look for signs of the calutron method.
By relying upon "ladder" logic, they had searched for signs of
uranium enrichment using more conventional, modern methods.
Instead of climbing the ladder of development that nations
before it had climbed, however, Iraq turned to a "lateral"
technique. Instead of developing more advanced methods of
enriching uranium, the Iraqis constructed a large number of
calutrons to meet their needs . - Instead of going up the
development ladder, they stayed at one level and expanded "in
the horizontal." The world's intelligence organizations must
Timmerman, back cover
14b Norman, p. 644 .
147
"By-Ways that Lead to the Bomb, " The Economist , 2
July 1991, p. 101.
91
adapt their methods in order to detect all forms of nuclear
weapons progress, both vertical and horizontal.* 4 '
How will improved intelligence and reconnaissance
contribute to the four objectives mentioned previously?
Improved detection abilities may deter nations from desiring
nuclear weapons, because of the political costs of such an
effort being revealed. If these nations feel that any
clandestine action they undertake may be exposed, they may be
less likely to commit such an act. Upgrades in intelligence
and reconnaissance may also prevent those who desire nuclear
weapons from obtaining them. If exporting nations fear
exposure of illegal exports to nations interested in
proliferation, they may be less likely to take the risk. In
addition, the cost to those nations seeking nuclear weapons
will increase, due to the additional cost of concealing their
facilities from the outside world.
Intelligence and reconnaissance advancements could also
assist in coping with the nuclear arsenals of new nuclear
weapons nations. The sooner the rest of the world discovers
a nation that has "slipped through the cracks" of the
nonprolif erat ion regime and developed nuclear weapons, the
sooner economic and political pressure can be brought to bear
:i Horizontal, as it is used here, is defined as using an
antiquated method on a very large scale. This is a very
inefficient way of obtaining nuclear weapons, but given time
it can be successful. Vertical is defined as attempting to




upon such a nation to minimize the political or physical
damage that may result . This could include convincing such a
nation to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group or, conversely,
coordinating political and military measures to eliminate that
nation's ability to employ nuclear weapons.
This leads to the fourth conceivable objective: in some
cases, it might be deemed advisable to destroy the nuclear
arsenals of nations that obtain them. Enhanced intelligence
and reconnaissance can assist in targeting, as well as in
warning nations within range of the arsenal of a dangerous new
nuclear state that there is a threat that must be dealt with.
The Gulf War was an excellent example of what a lack of
intelligence can do to the targeting ability of a coalition
attempting to destroy the nuclear weapons production
capability of a state. In Iraq the U.N. coalition did not
know about the locations of the ten nuclear sites mentioned
previously; they only knew about the site at Thuwaitha.
Therefore, an expensive clean-up procedure was necessary even
after extensive air operations against Iraq. With accurate
intelligence, Iraq's nuclear capabilities could have been
destroyed in the early days of the war; instead the U.N. is
still trying to track down the facilities involved in Iraq's
nuclear weapons program.
Military intelligence in the United States seems to
understand the need for an increase in role of intelligence in
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future non-proliferation efforts, as this statement from
General James R. Clapper, Jr. attests:
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and
advanced conventional weaponry is growing higher on my
list of priorities. As Mr. Gates has testified, some 20
countries already have or are attempting to acquire
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. I am concerned
that our list of countries could expand in the future.
Many third world countries are developing dual-use
technologies that could be diverted for the production of
such weapons. . . All of this obviously underscores the need
for continuing close coordination between intelligence and
policy in confronting these threats.-"'
B. POLITICAL WEAPONS
The primary political weapons, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, displayed
some serious shortcomings in the Iraqi experience. Since the
safeguards implemented by the N.P.T. and the I.A.E.A. were
only in effect at declared sites, there were at least nine
sites in Iraq that were under no safeguards whatsoever. The
NPT also has no provision for punishment if an offender is
caught. Therefore there are only political incentives to obey
the restrictions contained within it. A third shortcoming of
the present political regime is an inability to deal with
dual-use materials. Dual-use refers to both civilian and
military nuclear applications. A fourth weakness, although it
does not apply to Iraq because Iraq was a signatory of the
14
' James R. Clapper, Lt . Gen., USAF, Director of Defense
Intelligence Agency, Testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 22 January 1992, p. 17.
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NPT, is the fact that the NPT is not all-inclusive. Since
only the nations that sign the NPT are subject to its
restrictions, nations such as China, Israel, South Africa,
India, and Pakistan have been able to engage in nuclear trade
without any international safeguards (although China and South
Africa have since joined the NPT) . If these shortcomings can
be corrected, at least to some degree, the NPT and the
I.A.E.A. may become more effective instruments in the struggle
against nuclear proliferation; if not, however, the present
nonprolif erat ion regime may lose credibility as more and more
nations take advantage of its weaknesses.
In order to fully understand the successes and failures of
the current non-proliferation regime, it is necessary to
examine the original attempt to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons: the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. This plan, overcome
by the political situation in the late 1940s, may hold some
clues for a more successful future non-proliferation regime.
The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, compiled in March 1946,
suggests three criteria through which the success of a non-
proliferation regime could be measured: the extent to which
it afforded security against atomic warfare, the extent that
it removed the possibility of atomic weapons being used in
war, and the extent it established patterns of wisdom. The
document stressed the need for international control over all
dangerous nuclear activities as the means to best achieve
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these goals.* Although such control may be an impossible
task even in the current political situation, there are
several points contained within the report that may have
applications in the effort to increase the viability of the
non-proliferation regime:
• Inspections are not sufficient in and of themselves to
stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
• If weapons grade material is allowed to be used for
peaceful purposes, no safeguard system could prevent
diversion to weapons applications.
• An effective safeguard system must reduce the problem to
manageable proportions and provide unambiguous warning
signals. Clear, definable barriers between legal and
illegal activities must be drawn.
• Any inspection agency set up must keep up, both
technically and imaginatively, with the organizations and
nations attempting to evade its safeguards.
• Negative enforcement, such as economic sanctions directed
toward states attempting to attain nuclear weapons status,
is not sufficient. If a nonprolif eration regime is to be
successful, it must also employ some measure of positive
reinforcement, such as rewarding cooperating nations with
access to peaceful nuclear energy." •
When the current non-proliferation regime is analyzed
using the above criteria, it falls short in many areas. First
of all, the I.A.E.A. depends totally upon N.P.T. safeguards to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. These safeguards are
U.S. Department of State, "A Report on the
International Control of Atomic Energy, " Publication No. 2498,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 March 1946),
p . 3 .
The above points were taken from "A Report on the
International Control of Atomic Energy, " in the following
manner: points 1 and 4 came from page 6, point 2 from page
21, 3 from pages 9 and 22, and 5 from page 9.
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an important factor in the effort to prevent nuclear
proliferation, but they should not be the sole tool. It must
be remembered that N.P.T. safeguards only provide partial
protection against one path to nuclear proliferation:
diversion
.
. . . [SJafeguards are only designed to detect one step on
one of the paths to nuclear weapons- the diversion of
nuclear material from declared peaceful nuclear activities
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
I.A.E.A. safeguards under the treaty are primarily systems
of material accountancy, designed to verify statements by
an N.P.T. party regarding the presence, amounts and use of
nuclear material on its territory. They depend greatly on
the declarations, and the national systems of accounting
and control, of the states being inspected.'
'
Although this is a vital operation that must be performed,
it is useful to recall that the Acheson-Lilienthal report
concluded that if weapons grade material is allowed to be used
for peaceful purposes, no form of safeguarding will be
successful. Iraq proved that diversion can be accomplished on
a small scale, although Iraq depended primarily upon
indigenous uranium enrichment. At the Tuwaitha site, which
was subject to I.A.E.A. safeguards (unlike most of Iraq's
uranium enrichment program) , the Iraqis had managed to divert
three grams of plutonium, which, although insignificant in
military terms, demonstrated that the current safeguard system
even has some problems dealing with the only problem it has
the ability to confront.'
1C
'- Pilat, p. 1227.
Nye, p. 1294-95
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The lack of a warning signal or barrier short of nuclear
weapons production is yet another shortcoming of the current
regime. The present system allows for all components
necessary for atomic bomb production to be present, as long as
no assembly of a device takes place, without violation of the
N.P.T. Once a non-nuclear weapons state has acquired these
components and wishes to produce nuclear weapons, it only need
serve notice to the I.A.E.A. that it is withdrawing from the
N.P.T. Under the "supreme interests" clause (Article X), a
nation may withdraw on "three months" notice, while retaining
the nuclear materials and technical expertise that it gained
as a signatory of the N.P.T. The Acheson-Lilienthal
suggestion that individual nations and citizens be prohibited
from engaging in activities deemed "inherently dangerous,
"
such as uranium mining and using weapons grade material for
peaceful purposes" 4 may be politically impossible to
implement, but a middle ground reducing such activities to a
more manageable level may be within reach of the current
regime
.
Although the I.A.E.A. has kept up technically with the
nations it safeguards, the Iraqi situation has revealed a
problem of imagination. By relying upon old technology, such
as calutrons, the Iraqis were able to conceal large portions
of their nuclear weapons program. The I.A.E.A. must
Acheson-Lilienthal, p. 22
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concentrate on detecting all forms of enrichment, not simply
modern forms such as the gas centrifuge.
Although calutron technology is probably not controllable,
we cannot afford to regard it as an unlikely path to
enrichment. We will need to monitor indicators of
electromagnetic separation programs (for example, massive
electricity use) and share information and intelligence on
possible users. 1 -"
The I.A.E.A. has perhaps over-emphasized positive
reinforcement rather than negative enforcement. As well as
being responsible for preventing the diversion of nuclear
materials meant for peaceful purposes to military
applications, the I.A.E.A. is responsible for fostering the
exchange of peaceful nuclear technology from nuclear weapons
states to non-nuclear states."' 1 This dual role may
undermine the I.A.E.A. 's ability to safeguard the nuclear
material obtained by non-nuclear weapons states. Despite the
Acheson-Lilienthal report's faith in "denaturing" as a process
whereby nuclear materials can be rendered inadequate for use
in a weapons program, it has since been established that
denaturing does not prevent materials earmarked for peaceful
purposes from being used for weapons." Therefore, there is
a paradox created:
155 Pilat, p. 1228.
Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today
, p. 437.
Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas A.Brown, Gregory Jones,
David C. McGarvey, Henry Rowen, Vmce Taylor, and Roberta
Wohlstetter, Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential





In fact, the fundamental overlap of the paths to nuclear
explosives and to civilian uses of nuclear energy has been
recognized since the mid-1940s. We have almost from the
start said that the military and civilian atoms were
substantially identical, yet paradoxically, that we wanted
to stop the one and promote the other.
The I.A.E.A. has begun to take measures to correct its
faults. Hans Blix, the director of this organization, has
suggested that a subcommittee be set up in the I.A.E.A. in
order to hear intelligence reports from member nations that
involve nuclear proliferation in other nations. 1 " 1 There are
two major weaknesses with this approach. First of all,
nations may report such activities in order to harass another
nation for political or economic reasons, or in order to throw
suspicion off of itself. Although the subcommittee is to be
designed with the ability to investigate claims to insure that
they are valid, false reports could take up resources that
could be better used elsewhere.
The second, and most important, fault with this approach
lays within the concept of intelligence-sharing itself: would
a nation be willing to give its intelligence information to
the I.A.E.A., which is made up of one-hundred and forty
nations? Giving such information to such a vast body would
mean giving valuable intelligence to foes as well as friends,
and may be politically impractical. These weaknesses will
158 Ibid.
, p. 17 .
Paul Lewis, "Atomic Energy Agency Maps Plans to go
After Nuclear Cheats," New York Times, 11 October 1991, p. A6
.
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dilute the effectiveness of the proposed measure, and lead to
the conclusion that more actions are necessary on the part of
the I.A.E.A. if it is to remain a viable organization.
The I.A.E.A. needs to expand its inspection capabilities
beyond the current limitations of examining only declared
sites. The NPT treaty contains provisions for inspecting
undeclared locations.
Under the basic procedures for NPT inspections
(INFCIRC/153) , however, the IAEA retains a virtually never-
exercised right to request special inspections at
undeclared sites or locations, particularly if it believes
this necessary to fulfill its responsibilities to
safeguard all nuclear material and all peaceful nuclear
activities in NPT parties. If the NPT party refuses that
request, the matter- if 'essential and urgent'- can be
referred by the IAEA Director-General to the Board of
Governors . The Board then has recourse to the UN Security
Council .
•
The I.A.E.A. needs to reaffirm its right to conduct such
special inspections, and take advantage of this provision. If
possible, the organization should seek means to increase its
inspection power, although political limitations may arise:
if nations intent on nuclear proliferation feel they are being
pressured too much, they may opt out of the treaty
organization by way of the 'supreme interests' clause that
permits a nation to withdraw from the NPT with only "three
months" notice if said nation feels its "supreme interests"
are at stake. 1 " 1 Therefore, any moves to increase the power
Dunn, p . 31
.




of inspection must go forward cautiously. The necessary
caution probably precludes any attempts to add an 'anytime,
anywhere' clause to the treaty.
The I.A.E.A. must also seek to give the U.N. Security
Council a larger role in the non-proliferation regime.' l An
increased linkage between the I.A.E.A. and the United Nations
Security Council is perhaps the most important step in the
fight against nuclear proliferation. If a precedent could be
established that involves the U.N. Security Council to a
greater degree, this might lend the NPT the teeth that it
currently lacks. Perhaps this could be done by giving the
I.A.E.A. Director-General a more direct link to the Security
Council. 1 ' The I.A.E.A. also needs to keep better tabs
on dual-use materials and equipment. Iraq diverted large
amounts of materials and equipment gained under peaceful
auspices to weapons applications. The Iraqis were able to do
this because of the outdated mode of uranium enrichment they
used; the exporters that actually cared whether their
merchandise went to peaceful purposes may not have realized
Kay, p. 4. David Kay feels that the UNSC "... needs
to take a forthright and clear stand that any further
acquisition or attempted acquisition of nuclear weapons by any
state will be considered by it as a threat to international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter..."
Dunn, p. 31.
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that these exports were going to calutron production. 1 '"1 The
same lack of realization may also be attributed to the
I.A.E.A. Therefore, the I.A.E.A., working in concert with the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, needs to increase the number of
imports that it monitors as potentially dangerous.
Any political solution to the nuclear proliferation regime
is going to be severely limited in its effectiveness. The
above improvements, however, could give the I.A.E.A. a more
valuable role in the struggle to reduce this threat, as long
as the United Nations Security Council is brought into the
picture, especially the Special Commission. A stronger
inspection regime could reduce the desire to obtain nuclear
weapons the same way that improved intelligence could, by
increasing the risk that an offending nation will be caught.
The I.A.E.A must also cease activities which hinder the
efforts of the other organizations attempting to stop nuclear
proliferation. An example of this has been provided by the
repeated statements by the I.A.E.A. 's Maurizio Zifferero, who
has been making public statements since June 1992 that the
Iraqi nuclear weapons clean-up is complete, and that only
details remain. 1 '- These statements have been made despite
constant efforts by the U.N. delegations to demonstrate that
* Once again, the Timmerman book discusses in great
detail actions by firms that, both knowingly and unknowingly,
helped Iraq in its quest for nuclear weapons
.
Gary Milholin, "Iraq's Game Won't Fool the UN Eye,"
The International Herald Tribune
, 30 June 1992, p. 6.
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there are major portions of Iraq's nuclear weapons program
that still need to be uncovered.
Zifferero's statement was interpreted by some as giving
Iraq a clean bill of health on the nuclear issue, a step
which could have put pressure on the U.N. Security Council
to ease sanctions. On September 4, the IAEA issued a
clarification stating that Zifferero's comment did "not
exclude the possibility of further discoveries [of nuclear
activities] in the future," and that "it is still too
early to conclude that such [surprises] will not be the
case." But Zifferero, the same day, essentially repeated
his earlier judgement, saying "at present, there is no
such thing as an ongoing Iraqi nuclear program."'
This seems to demonstrate the paradox that the I.A.E.A. must
operate within: at the same time it is promoting the spread
of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, it is attempting to
monitor and safeguard this same material to ensure it is being
used for its stated purpose.
A stronger I .A. E .A. , coupled with the U .N. S .C
.
, could also
deter nations attempting to get nuclear weapons from getting
them. If more intense inspection procedures discovered that
a nation was cheating, export freezes could be placed upon any
future dealings with this nation until it dismantled its
nuclear weapons program. Also, stronger inspection procedures
could deter other nations from exporting goods that could be
used in a nuclear weapons program. If such a nation feared
that these safeguards could detect that it was involved, fear
of political repercussions might prevent it from dealing with
a nation that had ulterior motives involving nuclear weapons.
Jon B. Wolfsthal, "IAEA Inspector Calls Iraq Nuclear-
Program Over," Arms Control Today , September 1992, p. 29.
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C. EXPORT CONTROLS AND ECONOMIC TOOLS
The degree to which the nations of Western Europe and the
United States assisted in the creation of a nuclear-
proliferation problem in Iraq underscores the need for a
revamping of the current system of export controls.
Multinational corporations, at least in some cases, have
exhibited influence over the governmental oversight
organizations in charge of monitoring exports. In other
cases, government concerns in other areas have overridden
concerns about export-assisted nuclear proliferation. These
nations have already started to upgrade the export regime that
is in place, through new controls on dual-use exports and by
bringing new nations, such as China, into its confines. : '
There are many more steps that must be taken, however, both in
the international sense and by individual nations.
The primary tool of the current international export
control system is the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The N.S.G. was
created in 1978, in reaction to the 1974 Indian "peaceful
nuclear explosion," which was the result of U.S. and Canadian
nuclear exports to that country. : The N.S.G. places
restrictions on the export of nuclear equipment and material
Dunn, p . 28 .
Nye, p. 1294
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by stating that the recipient nation must agree to certain
stipulations. These stipulations include: pledging not to
use said goods for the manufacture of nuclear weapons;
acceptance of international safeguards; a provision for
adequate security of imported nuclear materials and equipment;
an agreement not to re-export these goods unless the secondary
recipient nation agrees to the same stipulations and the
original exporter agrees with the second trade; restraint with
items that may prove valuable in weapons production; and
agreements to seek regional facilities instead of unilateral
ones. 1 ' A strength of this organization is that it includes
France, which until 1991 was not a part of the N.P.T. m A
serious weakness of the NSG is that, if the exporting
country's government chooses to look the other way for
domestic reasons as a firm ships out nuclear materials, it is
very difficult to enforce the provisions of the NSG.
In order to upgrade the export control system currently in
place a number of steps must be taken. First of all,
governments must be held accountable for the actions of firms
within their borders. Once again, if the U.N. Security
Council could take a more active role in disciplining
irresponsible governments, perhaps such actions could be






comprised of individuals from all the NSG nations could be
placed in positions within each country to monitor nuclear
exports. This could discourage rules-breaking by the member
governments by increasing the odds that they could be caught
.
Third, efforts must be made to convince all nations to sign
the NSG treaty. This could fill the gaps that are present
currently, which are created by nations that are outside the
auspices of the NSG. The U.N.S.C. could be a fine forum to
spread the authority of the treaty.
Once all of these international steps have been taken to
strengthen the export regime, a key problem, revealed by the
Iraqi case, will remain: tracking dual-use exports. Steps
have been taken towards correcting this weakness:
In 1991, nuclear suppliers met to tighten controls on the
dual -use technologies that may be used for both nuclear
weapons and civilian purposes, and Britain and France
declared that they, like most major supplier countries,
would require that any recipient state must place all of
its nuclear facilities under I.A.E.A. safeguards, not
merely those facilities that involved transferred
materials . m
Even with such improvements in the export control system, it
is likely that calutron technology, and the imports it
requires, will remain uncontrollable from a supply
standpoint. 1 - Therefore, the actions of the N.S.G. must be
coordinated with those of the I.A.E.A. and the United Nations
Security Council in an effort to close all gaps in the current
171 Nye, p. 1294.
Pilat, p. 122;
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non-proliferation regime. If it is difficult to determine
whether exports are to be used towards improper ends, agencies
should search for other signs that illegal activities are
taking place .
'
The key use of export controls towards meeting the goals
of non-proliferation is preventing a nation that desires
nuclear weapons from acquiring them. Export controls also
raise the cost to the importing nation by making it more
difficult to acquire the equipment and material needed to
produce nuclear weapons. This may discourage some nations
from attempting to acquire these types of weapons.
The case of the United States has been singled out by Gary
Milholin, the Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
Control. In his assessment of United States actions during
the creation of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, he finds a
number of faults with the way the U.S. handles nuclear
exports. Two of his criticisms involve more Congressional
oversight and less secrecy, but the third is the most
compelling
:
It [Congress] should take this function [dual-use
licensing] away from [the Department of] commerce and give
it to an independent regulatory agency such as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission or to some other department, such as
[the Department of] defense, that has no export promotion
function. . . It would be safer and more logical to make the
Ibid. Pilat uses the example of searching for massive
electricity use when attempting to determine if calutrons are
being operated. A second useful technique that has been
suggested by the U.N. and the I.A.E.A. is to test waterways
for radioactive indicators.
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Defense Department the "hub" for controlling all exports
relevant to nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile
proliferation... Commerce, which has no substantive
expertise on dual-use technology, should retain only a
record-keeping function. 1,4
This brings the same problem to light within the U.S. export
monitoring system that is present in the international non-
proliferation regime, and specifically the I.A.E.A.: The same
organization that promotes the export of nuclear materials for
so-called "peaceful purposes" conducts the licensing
procedures to determine if exports are going to the stated end
use. Whether Mr. Milholin's idea is followed, or a third
organization is created in order to license exports, this is
a contradiction in missions that must be resolved.
The embargo is an economic tool that is second in utility
only to export controls. An embargo can be brought to bear
upon a nation that is openly violating rules of non-
proliferation as a weapon to force said nation to give up its
attempts at nuclear-arming. The most recent example is the
U.N. embargo against Iraq, but it has had mixed results at
best . The Iraqis have not responded to the embargo by
complying with U.N. directives concerning nuclear weapons.
Rather, Iraq has made attempt after attempt to block the
elimination of its nuclear weapons program.
Attempting to force a leader like Saddam Hussein to comply
with world demands through an embargo is a difficult task.
174 Gary Milholm, Licensing Mass Destruction: U.S
Exports to Iraq: 1985-1990
, p. 13.
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First of all, he is not the personally affected; the people of
his nation are. As he has demonstrated repeatedly in the Gulf
War, the Iran-Iraq War, and the repeated harsh treatment of
his own citizens, Hussein is not concerned with the public's
well-being
.
The embargo could be rationalized as an attempt to put the
people of Iraq in such a dire situation that they will
overthrow Saddam. This is not a valid argument, however,
given the strategic culture of Iraq as discussed in an earlier
portion of this thesis. Secondly, Hussein may see his grip on
power loosening, and may see his military as the only
instrument that is keeping him in power. He does not want to
see his military weakened in any way, which the elimination of
nuclear-weapons programs would do. Third, Saddam has made
seeking the atomic bomb a virtual crusade since taking power
in July of 1968, and he is very reluctant to give up the
progress he has made. His stated goal has been an Arab atomic
bomb, ' "" and he may feel that this project gives him prestige
in the Arab world. ,
These factors create a situation in Iraq that is unique
when compared to that of other nations. Although in the
situation in Iraq the results of the embargo have not been as
successful as the U.N. may have hoped, this does not mean that
embargoes are useless as a tool to force a nation to give up
Timmerman, p. 6.
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its nuclear-weapons program. It may be the only viable
alternative to undertaking a major military engagement against
a nation seeking nuclear weapons.
Economic embargoes, if successful, can be used in two ways
to achieve the goal of limiting nuclear proliferation. First
of all, an embargo can convince a nation to give up its quest
for nuclear weapons. If the cost to such a nation is
increased due to this form of economic punishment, it may
decide to forego the benefits of possessing a nuclear arsenal .
Secondly, embargoes can make it difficult for a nation that
has already acquired nuclear weapons capability to maintain
it. If the raw materials and equipment necessary to continue
fielding a nuclear force and the infrastructure that support
it are cut off, then a nation may have no choice but to
eliminate its nuclear capability.
Ill
CONCLUSION
The only way to stop the problem of nuclear proliferation
is with a unified worldwide effort. The U.N. Security Council
should become the primary tool in the fight to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons. The U.N. is the only organization
that contains all the parties involved, has the ability to
make international laws with all of the parties present in the
decision-making, and has the ability to enforce these laws in
a multilateral fashion.
The U.N. has the ability to use all the tools discussed in
this thesis: intelligence, and economic and political
weapons. The nations of Europe and the United States must be
at the forefront of these actions, however, and ensure that
they follow standards that have been developed in previous
non-proliferation efforts. With the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, nuclear weapons proliferation is becoming one of
the leading threats to world peace. The break-up of the
U.S.S.R. has also magnified the problem of nuclear
proliferation by giving some nations access to Soviet nuclear
technology. The threat of nuclear proliferation is very real,
and the current non-proliferation regime is proving itself
unable to deal with it.
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The current non-proliferation regime is at a vital
crossroads in its history. Depending upon the results of the
inspections in Iraq, the I.A.E.A. could flourish or fail. If
the Iraqi nuclear weapons program revives after the
inspections are concluded, the Vienna-based I.A.E.A. will be
revealed as incapable of stemming the tide of nuclear
proliferation. If the Iraqi nuclear weapons program does not
resume operations in a manner that will lead to the bomb
within the next few years, then perhaps the world's confidence
in the I.A.E.A. can be restored. This is dependent, however,
on how large a role the I.A.E.A. plays in preventing the
Iraqis from reviving their nuclear weapons program. The
U.N.S.C. should play a larger role in the future of nuclear
non-proliferation, leaving the I.A.E.A. in an advisory role.
An alternative argument that may arise is that the
I.A.E.A. could be strengthened in an effort to stem nuclear
proliferation, rather than replaced. However, the I.A.E.A. 's
lack of enforcement powers and the international community's
inability to force nations to join the NPT regime or to retain
nations that desire to withdraw from the regime both place the
I.A.E.A. in an untenable situation. Perhaps the only way to
strengthen the present regime is to change the language of the
treaty itself; but that might cause an exodus of nations
interested in possibly pursuing nuclear weapons at some future
time, as well as of those nations which may feel that stricter
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inspection standards could interfere with their peaceful
nuclear programs
.
This leaves the I.A.E.A. in a "catch 22" situation: if
the language of the treaty is not strengthened, its current
weaknesses will remain; but, if the language is changed, the
number of signatory nations may well decline, hence weakening
the ability of the I.A.E.A. to contribute to a world free of
nuclear proliferation. This inability to prevent nations from
withdrawing from the treaty regime also hampers the I.A.E.A. 's
ability to invoke the aforementioned clause allowing it to
inspect undeclared facilities and to call on the U.N.S.C. for
assistance if these inspections are hampered. If this clause
was utilized, the target nation might choose to withdraw from
the regime rather than to submit to the demands.
These factors demonstrate the primary limitation of the
current I.A.E.A. regime: any nation that does not want to be
a part of the legal regime does not have to join it or to
remain within its confines. The U.N.S.C. can overcome this
limitation, because its enforcement capabilities (including
embargoes and peacekeeping) can force nations to comply. The
U.N.S.C. does not rely upon a nation's desire to be reined in
(with regard to nuclear weapons progress), and therefore the
I.A.E.A. must strengthen its link to that body. The Non-
Prolif eration Treaty has the same weakness as any treaty.
Compliance is only guaranteed as long as signatories wish to
comply. Therefore, strengthening the I.A.E.A. is not the only
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answer to limiting future nuclear proliferation. Giving more
responsibility to the U.N.S.C. in this area could be much more
effective. The spread of nuclear weapons is a threat to world
peace, and should be treated as such by the United Nations.
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